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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider this scenario: You are a junior trademark lawyer at 
your firm. You are proud of your work for the Client, protecting and 
enforcing the Client's young brand name. The Client is a midsize 
company, seeking to increase growth and working hard to compete 
against others in the marketplace. Last year, you helped the Client 
to conclude a lawsuit against an infringer who had adopted a mark 
very similar to the Client's trademark. In the complaint, you 
included both federal trademark infringement and unfair 
competition claims. As usual, you requested injunctive relief, 
damages, attorney's fees, and costs in the complaint. The litigation 
was factually intensive, as you had to establish likelihood of 
consumer confusion for both the trademark infringement and unfair 
competition claims. In the end, you won for the Client. The Client 
incurred half a million dollars in litigation costs. 
You have just received a call from the Client. The IRS has 
challenged the Client's claimed deduction of the $500,000 in 
litigation costs as ordinary business expenses. The Commissioner 
reasons that the two claims contained in the complaint for the 
trademark litigation drafted by you are very distinct, warranting 
different tax treatments. The Commissioner also wants to 
arbitrarily apportion the costs: $250,000 for the infringement 
claim and $250,000 for the unfair competition claim. The cost 
associated with the unfair competition claim is allowed to be 
immediately deducted, while the cost for the trademark 
infringement claim must be capitalized. 
You are confused. You don't know anything about taxation of 
trademarks. You only know trademark law, the subject matter 
that you fell in love with during law school. You and everyone who 
practices trademark law know that trademark infringement and 
unfair competition claims are virtually the same. Something 
about the distinction in tax treatment of the two claims bothers 
you. The Client now asks you to take care of this matter. You 
have no idea what to do at this moment. 
Consider the next scenario: Still feeling quite confused, you 
decide to take a break by focusing on different matters for the 
Client for the time being. You notice that the Client has typically 
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expended a large sum every year in advertising expenditures in its 
efforts to sell products in connection with the Client's trademark. 
The Client engages in a wide range of branding activities, ranging 
from placing ads in the local newspapers, maintaining a strong 
presence online through social media outlets, purchasing keywords 
from Google, and keeping the Client's website fresh with new 
content. The Client generally seeks a tax deduction in full for the 
costs associated with these usual branding activities, and the IRS 
has not challenged such tax return position. Recently, the Client 
has decided to rejuvenate its brand with a new advertisement 
campaign to inject a new image of youthfulness, boundless energy, 
and fun. You, however, believe that the existing brand is doing 
just fine, as goods are selling well. Therefore, you don't quite see 
the need for a new, extensive, and expensive advertisement 
campaign. On the trademark front, you are pleased that this new 
campaign will enhance the visibility of the trademark, cultivating 
an identity for the brand and increasing the level of protection for 
the trademark. 
The Client calls you again, inquiring whether the costs 
associated with the expensive advertisement campaign to 
rejuvenate the trademark will also be deductible like other usual 
brand advertisement expenditures. You politely remind the Client 
that you know next to nothing about the tax treatment of branding 
expenditures. The Client insists that you look into the matter 
because, after all, you are the trademark maven and this matter 
does relate to trademark. Again, you don't know where to look for 
the answer. 
Unfortunately, the answers for the two scenarios above are 
contained in a web of tax statutes, regulations, cases, and 
administrative rulings that emerged in the absence of a rational 
legal framework, providing a host of incoherent tax distinctions for 
branding investment. Welcome to branding taxation, a zone of 
discomfort for both intellectual property and tax scholars and 
practitioners. 
Branding is important not only to businesses, 1 but also to the 
economy.2 The intellectual property laws and tax laws should thus 
1 See generally Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 83 (2010) (observing 
modern usage of brands by corporations to build spiritual attachments); Deven R. Desai, 
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further the legitimate goals of encouraging and protecting brand 
investments while maintaining a sound tax base. Intellectual 
property protections for branding depend on advertisement and 
enforcement, both of which demand significant amounts of private 
investment by firms. Although one would expect similar tax 
treatments of both categories of investment, the categories are 
actually treated as vastly different for federal income tax 
purposes. Additionally, tax distinctions also exist within each 
category. The result is that some branding investments are 
expensed and others are not. No article has explored in depth 
these tax distinctions for branding activities. This Article fills that 
void by evaluating tax rules governing branding within a 
normative tax policy framework and advancing several proposals 
where tax distinctions lack theoretical justification. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II focuses on the branding 
role in business. This Part investigates how companies assert 
their presence through branding and utilizing a wide range of 
tactics to attract attention, build loyalty, and enhance goodwill. 
Companies also embrace major branding campaigns to rescue 
brands from fiascos or to inject new life into stale brands. 
In addition to branding expenditures, companies fiercely protect 
their brands through applicable laws. Parts III and IV of this 
Article turn to trademark law and copyright law, respectively, for 
potential claims asserted by brand owners against infringers. The 
Lanham Act, under the theories of trademark anti-dilution, 
From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981 (2012) (acknowledging modern business 
practices with brands and advancing a new brand theory for trademarks); Jeremy N. Sheff, 
Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245 (2011) (discussing brand equity and suggesting a 
new alternative model for brand equity with consumer protection). 
2 Companies were projected to spend $180 billion on advertising expenditures in 2014. 
Total Media Advertising Spending in the United States from 2011 to 2018, STATISTA, http:// 
www .statista.com/statistics/272314/advertising-spending-in-the-us/ (last visited Dec. 27, 
2015). The impact of branding expenditures support job creation in the United States. For 
every $1 million of advertising money expenditures, eighty-one jobs are created. Press 
Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, New Study Underscores Advertising's Role as a Critical 
Driver of the U.S. Economy (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.ana.net/content/showlid/29144. The 
contribution of the advertising industry to the economy also occurs outside the United 
States. See generally ALEXANDRA ALBERT & BENJAMIN REID, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY TO THE UK ECONOMY: A CREATIVE INDUSTRIES REPORT (2011), 
http://www.theworkfoundation.com/DownloadPublication/Report/295_The%20contribution 
%20of"/o20advertising% 20to%20the%20UK%0economy%203l1011.pdf. 
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infringement, and unfair competition, protects brands that are 
primarily words or logos, as well as the total image, look and feel, 
and packaging of a product or service.3 In branding activities, 
companies often create brand content protected under copyright 
law. In the enforcement of brands and brand content, companies 
incur substantial litigation costs under trademark law and 
copyright law. 
Part V of this Article explores the evolution of the current tax 
regime governing brand building and enforcement. Under the 
present system, advertising costs to foster brand equity are 
expensed (with the exception of the costs of tangible assets 
associated with advertising). In contrast, litigation costs incurred 
to protect that enhancement of value must be capitalized (with the 
exception of legal costs in unfair competition claims). 
Part VI of this Article critiques the current tax regime governing 
branding and makes appropriate recommendations where current 
rules lack theoretical justification. It offers sound policy arguments 
in support of tax law's current treatment (expensing) of usual brand 
advertising-the costs of ordinary product, institutional, or goodwill 
advertising. Chiefly, expensing ordinary brand advertising 
stimulates economic growth and furthers administrative efficiency. 
Further, expensing creates an even playing field between 
businesses that advertise their own brands and businesses that 
choose, instead, to license from others the right to use well-known 
trademarks in connection with products they manufacture and sell. 
Part VI, however, also questions whether the current unfavorable 
tax treatment of tangible assets associated with advertising 
potentially distorts firms' brand strategies, thus violating the 
principle of tax neutrality. 
Part VI then makes the case that tax law should be changed to 
require the capitalization of unusual brand advertising-the costs 
of marketing campaigns, graphic designs, and package designs. 
This Part critiques the historic development of rules governing 
campaign expenditures, suggesting they resulted from a lack of 
clarity over the proper standard to apply. This Part also suggests 
that a more appropriate standard might be found in the rules 
3 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
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governing the tax treatment of repairs and improvements to 
tangible property. Specifically, it argues that advertising 
campaign expenditures, which strengthen, restore, or elevate the 
brand, can be analogized to improvement costs of tangible 
property, which have long been considered nondeductible capital 
expenditures. 
Part VI concludes by identifying an appropriate tax framework 
for brand enforcement expenditures. It criticizes the current tax 
distinction between litigation costs incurred in connection with 
trademark infringement claims (capitalized) and similar costs 
incurred in connection with unfair competition claims (expensed), 
arguing that such distinction merely elevates form over substance. 
If substance is to prevail in tax jurisprudence, the litigation costs 
associated with both actions should be capitalized, reflecting that 
both are brought primarily to establish the taxpayer's trademark 
and not to recover income. Likewise, consistent tax treatment 
curbs arbitrary apportionment of costs. 
II. THE BRANDING ROLE IN BUSINESS 
Branding is everywhere.4 Branding is one of the most 
important aspects of any business.5 Branding allows a company to 
' See, e.g., Joseph C. Daniels, The Branding of America: The Rise of Geographic 
Trademarks and the Need for a Strong Fair Use Defense, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1703, 1720-21 
(2009) (noting the wide spread of branding by public and private entities throughout the 
United States); Daniel J. Kevles, A Primer of A, B, Seeds: Advertising, Branding, and 
Intellectual Property in an Emerging Industry, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 657, 657-05 (2013) 
(discussing branding and tracing its history in the innovation of seeds and related industries); 
Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 910-13 (2013) (studying the function of 
brands and recommending the use of brands to signify privacy commitments); Omari Scott 
Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware's Dominance and the Market for Corporate 
Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1133, 1143-51 (2008) (analyzing how Delaware becomes a 
brand fur corporate charters and noting that the "Delaware brand is more than mere 
marketing or advertising; it is a mixture of tangible and intangible elements that firms 
value"). See generally Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate 
Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006) (exploring the effects of branding (.'()nsumers 
through a study of four corporate deal structures). 
s John Williams, The Basics ofBranding, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/ 
article/77408 (last visited May 24, 2016); see also Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying 
Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1182-85 (2010) (explaining that corporate 
branding is important to not only the customers, but also the employees, of a company); 
Ohm, supra note 4, at 937 (noting that words and symbols are information devices used to 
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communicate with its customers what they can expect from the 
company's products or services as well as distinguish the 
company's offerings from those of competitor.6 Branding provides 
the company opportunities to deliver its promises to customers, 
build customers' emotional attachment to products, and cultivate 
long-lasting customer affinity.7 Branding also allows a customer 
to express her preference, individuality, and identity.s 
Companies deploy their branding strategies in multiple, 
creative ways.9 For example, Hyundai entices customers to buy 
cars by providing them the Hyundai Assurance-if the customer 
loses income the year following purchase, Hyundai will allow the 
customer to return the car. 10 Southwest Airlines operates 
revolutionarily differently from all other airlines by providing 
FREE BAGS, FLY HERE™ service as part of its image as the 
"people's airline."11 Starbucks adopted the unprecedented 
listening-to-action concept in My Starbucks Ideas to get 150,000 
ideas from its customers, "leading to the implementation of 277 
new innovations for Starbucks." 12 Burger King promoted the 
efficiently "communicate to potential customers that the product or service has been backed 
by a known source who guarantees a specific level of quality and accountability"). 
6 Williams, supra note 5 ("[Y]our brand is your promise to your customer. It tells them 
what they can expect from your products and services, and it differentiates your offering 
from your competitors."). 
7 Id. 
8 See Desai, supra note 1, at 989 ("[C]onsumers may simultaneously use brands as 
expressions of individuality and identity as they take a brand and alter it to match what 
they see as the meaning of the brand and how that meaning relates to their self-image or 
message."); Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 803 (2012) ("[T]he 
'quality' sought by consumers in the market for status goods is the quality of the message 
the brand conveys: its ability to communicate social status to others."). 
9 See Gus Lubin, 60 Daring Brand Strategies That Paid Off, Bus. INSIDER (May 14, 
2012, 11: 17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/brands-that-get-people-talking-2012-5?0 
p=l (listing various creative techniques for branding, including "making new rules, 
marketing a belief, creating belonging inability expression, creating culture, leveraging 
tension, using scarcity and encouraging play"). 
10 Id. 
II Id. 
12 Press Release, Starbucks, Starbucks Celebrates Five-Year Anniversary of My Starbucks 
Idea (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130328006372/en/Starbuck 
s-Celebrates-Five-Year-Anniversary-Starbucks-Idea; see also Mike Schoultz, How Starbucks 
Used My Starbucks Idea to Ace Crowdsourcing, DIGITAL SPARK MKTG., http://www.digitalspar 
kmarketing.com/innovation/my-starbucks-ideal (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (summarizing how 
Starbucks crowdsources through My Starbucks Idea by "encourage[ing] customers to submit 
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brand strategy for its Whopper with the Whopper Sacrifice reward, 
in which customers could earn a free Whopper each time they 
sacrificed and "defriended" ten friends on Facebook in the 
"Friendship is strong, but the Whopper is stronger" campaign.13 
Ben & Jerry's "blend[ed] Wall Street finance with Main Street 
values" when the company offered its stock directly to customers, 
employees, and friends of "Vermont residents" during its initial 
public offering.14 
With the arrival of online social media, companies have begun 
to identify and adopt new branding approaches to reach more 
customers. 15 They embrace social media and sites like Twitter, 
Linkedln, Google+, Facebook, YouTube, and Pinterest to increase 
their visibility to customers, partners, and searchers. 16 Companies 
understand that online visibility enhances and nurtures real 
relationships in both the virtual and real worlds. 17 In other words, 
they follow the mantra preached by brand executives: "Social 
media is a powerful tool for increasing visibility, building 
relationships, and connecting with others who are not in your 
geography. Build your social media strategy around your personal 
brand with authenticity, focus and consistency."18 
Examining various branding campaigns reveals that companies 
continuously search for and adopt creative and provocative 
methods to attract attention to their products or services. 19 
ideas for better products, improving the customer experience, and defining new community 
involvement, among other categories"). 
13 Andrew LaVallee, Burger King Cancels Facebook Ad Campaign, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 
2009, 4:4 7 PM), http://blogs. wsj.corn/digits/2009/01115/burger·king-cancels-facebook-ad-cam 
paign/. 
14 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 1606. 
15 See William Arruda, Three Elements of an Effective Social Media Strategy, FORBES 
(Aug. 27, 2013, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.corn/sites/williamarruda/2013/08/27/three-elem 
ents-of-an-effective-social-media-strategy/ ("Social media can be your best opportunity for 
enhancing relationships and expanding your brand."). 
16 Id. 
17 See id. ("If you're avoiding social media, you're invisible to those who seek what you 
have to offer. Be visible and available in the virtual world so you can expand your success 
in the real world! Connecting with your virtual brand community helps you build and 
nurture real relationships - relationships that will increase your success and fulfillment."). 
is Id. 
19 See Lubin, supra note 9 (explaining different creative branding methods used by 
various companies). 
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Companies know that without effective branding strategies, their 
products or services will very soon become unnoticed and 
forgotten. As a result, small and large companies spend vast 
monetary sums in their branding efforts. For example, in 2014, 
global advertising expenditures were expected to reach $523 
billion.20 In the United States, companies spent $167 billion in 
advertising expenditures in 2013, and the figure is predicted to 
reach $190 billion in 2016.21 Furthermore, the phenomenal 
growth in online advertisements delivered through mobile devices 
and desktop computers surpassed newspaper advertisements in 
2012 and likely exceeded both magazine and newspaper 
advertisements in 2015.22 
With all the branding strategies culminating m staggering 
advertising expenditures, companies compete for customer and 
partner attention. Some companies aim higher, reaching for and 
achieving the status of top national or global brands. Every year, 
Interbrand publishes its list of top global brands, showing the 
fluctuations among brands due to increases or decreases in their 
estimated values.23 The active movements among brands hint at 
fierce competition in the marketplace. For example, in 2011, 
Apple was eighth in the top brand list, Coca-Cola first, and Google 
fourth. 24 In 2012, Coca-Cola maintained first, Apple leaped to 
second, and Google remained fourth. 25 In 2013, Apple became the 
new leader, Google jumped to second, and Coca-Cola fell from first 
place for the first time in thirteen years to third.26 More 
profoundly, the movements among brands reflect "how we buy, 
20 JONATHAN BARNARD, ZENITH 0PTIMED1A, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ADVERTISING 
EXPENDITURE FORECASTS SEPTEMBER 2014 (2014), http://www.ZenithOptiMedia.silmedia/up 
loads/ _custom/adspend_forecasts_sep tember_20 l 4_executive_summary_2. pdf. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See e.g., Best Global Brands 2013, INTERBRAND, http://interbrand.com/wp-content/uplo 
ads/2015/08/Interbrand-Best-Global-Brands-2013.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2015) (listing 
Apple, Google, and Coca-Cola as the top three brands of 2013). 
24 Interbrand's Best Global Brands Report 2011, CAMPAIGN BRIEF, http://www.campaignbri 
ef.com/FINAL%20Interbrand%20Best%20Global%20Brands%202011.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 
2015). 
25 See Stuart Elliott, Apple Passes Coca-Cola as Most Valuable Brand, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/20 13/09/30/business/media/app le-passes-coca-cola-as-mo 
st-valuable-brand.html?_r=O (reporting brand movements between 2012 and 2013). 
26 Id. 
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how we communicate with each other, even whether we speak 
with each other."27 In other words, companies rely on branding to 
sell their products and services, and along the way, branding 
influences and changes "the way we live our lives."28 
Understanding the impact of brands in the marketplace, 
companies zealously guard the accumulated goodwill embodied in 
a brand. In addition to advertising expenditures, companies spend 
considerable efforts to minimize attracting negative attention to 
brands.29 For example, when Netflix faced major negative 
publicity when 800,000 subscribers dropped its service, Netflix 
immediately fixed the problem by rebranding itself from "being a 
home deliverer of discs to a producer of video content and streamer 
of video content to the homes of global subscribers, including a 
voice recognition system named 'max' that quizzes subscribers and 
gives them movie suggestions."30 Addressing negative publicity 
decisively with the new rebranding campaign, Netflix understood 
that the customer is fundamental to the creation of goodwill in the 
brand. In the fierce, competitive business world, goodwill is the 
"brand equity" or value that companies highly prize and protect in 
order to survive and strive.31 
21 Id. 
2s Id. 
29 See, e.g., Chris Book, 4 Keys to Turning Negative Commenters into Brand Advocates, 
CONVINCE & CONVERT, http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-crm/4-keys-to-turning-ne 
gative-commenters-into-brand-advocates/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (providing advice on 
how to respond to online critics); Caysey Welton, How to Respond If You Find Your Brand 
on Consumer Reports' 'Naughty List' this Season, PR NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www. 
prnewsonline.com/wa ter-cooler/2013/ 11/25/w hat-to-do-if-find-your-brand-on-the-naugh ty-lis 
ti (describing remedial actions for brands in the face of bad PR). 
30 Edward Lawler, Netflix: We Got It Right!, FORBES (June 24, 2013, 5:00 AM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/edwardlawler/2013/06/24/netflix-we-got-it-rightl. 
31 See Gigi De Vault, How to Measure Brand Equity, ABOUT.COM, http://marketresearch.abo 
ut.corn/od/market.research.advertising/ht/How-To-Measure-Brand-Equity.htm (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2015) ('The impact that a brand has on consumer purchases or perceptions about a 
product is known as brand equity. The word equity indicates that an asset has been 
generated. In brand equity, the asset is intangible and is measured in terms of the value 
attributed by a consumer or potential consumer to the product or service. Brand equity 
translates into consumer goodwill and propensity to prefer or buy a branded product or 
service."); see also Brand equity, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definiti 
on/brand-equity.html (last visited May 24, 2016) ("A brand's power derived from the goodwill 
and name recognition that it has earned over time, which translates into higher sales volume 
and higher profit margins against competing brands."). 
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III. PROTECTING BRANDS THROUGH LITIGATION 
In addition to :fiercely promoting brands in the marketplace,32 
companies rely on the legal system to enforce their brands against 
unauthorized use that may harm and reduce the value of their 
brand. There are three different theories of protection that 
provide possible causes of action to brand owners, depending on 
the level of brand recognition and the types of harm inflicted by 
unauthorized users. The three theories of protection are available 
to brands that are words, phrases, logos, and symbols, as well as 
trade dress or the total look and feel of a product or service. 
A. TRADEMARK DILUTION 
Famous brands and trademarks are omnipresent. They appear 
in digital and print media. They perch on bright billboards, 
moving vehicles, and glossy brochures. They are the embedded 
metatags programmed to appear on top of a search engines' 
results, 33 or the keywords for searches directed to sponsored 
links.34 They run across banner ads on computer screens and the 
digital screens in Times Square. They are the icons, images, and 
arbiters of culture, taste, desire, and power. 35 Famous names like 
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Samsung, Intel, BMW, Louis Vuitton, 
32 Samsung is a good example of how a company has engaged in the highly competitive 
tech industry to· become a leading brand. See Eric Pfanner & Brian Chen, Samsung: 
Uneasy in the Lead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com12013/12/15/technol 
ogy/Samsung-uneasy-in-the-lead.html?_r=o (describing Samsung's plan to maintain its lead 
amongst competitors). 
33 See Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(defining "metatags" as "a component of a web-page's programming that contains deceptive 
information about the webpage which is typically not observed when the webpage is 
displayed in a web browser" and noting that a competition had embedded the metatags of 
another company in its website to attract more consumers). 
:14 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142 
(9th Cir. 2011) (noting how companies advertise through the keyword method). 
35 R. Charles Henn, Jr. et al., Protecting Collegiate Color Schemes: How Recent 
Developments in Trademark Law Enable Institutions to Further Preserve and Strengthen 
Their Brand Identities, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. l, 4 (2012) ("Consumers' buying decisions 
directly result from trademark owners' cultivation of brand identities and brand 
personalities with which consumers desire to affiliate."). See also Desai, supra note 1, at 
985 (explaining how brands function as information sources for preferences, desires, and 
identity). 
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Coca-Cola, and McDonald's36 achieve their iconic status over time, 
largely due to enormous investment and vigilant enforcement by 
brand owners. 
The investment includes not just building the brand names in 
the marketplace, but also aggressive policing against any 
unauthorized use. 37 When a third party uses a mark that may 
dilute the distinctiveness of the brand, the brand owner will lean 
on trademark dilution law to enjoin the allegedly dilutive use. 
Under trademark dilution law, dilutive use covers the types of 
use that may likely cause tarnishment or blurring of the brand.38 
Tarnishment involves the defendant's use of the brand in an 
unwholesome way.39 For example, the Louis Vuitton brand owner 
:1G Apple ($98 billion), Google ($93 billion), Coca-Cola ($79 billion), Microsoft ($59 billion), 
McDonald's ($42 billion), Samsung ($39 billion), Intel ($37 billion), BMW ($31 billion), and 
Louis Vuitton ($24 billion) are among the top global brands. Aaron Taube, These Are the 20 
Most Valrtable Brands in the World, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2013, 5:02 PM), http://www.bu 
sinessinsider.com/these-are-the-20-most-valuable-brands-in-the-world-2013-9?op=l. 
37 Aggressive tactics or trademark bullying can also go too far and may cause unwanted 
negative publicity. The Supreme Court in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 733­
34 (2013) recognizes the problem of trademark bullying: 
Courts should be well aware that charges of trademark infringement can be 
disruptive to the good business relations between the manufacturer alleged 
to have been an infringer and its distributors, retailers, and investors. The 
mere pendency of litigation can mean that other actors in the marketplace 
may be reluctant to have future dealings with the alleged infringer. Nike 
appears to have been well aware of that dynamic in this case. 
See also Tamlin H. Bason, What Did We Learn from Already v. Nike?, BLOOMBERG BNA 
INTELL. PROP. BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.bna.com/learn-already-nike-bl 7179871889/ 
(discussing trademark bullying tactics employed by brand owner Nike); Jesse Bidgood, 
Chicken Chain Says Stop, but '/'-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.ny 
times.com/2011112105/us/eat-more-kale-t-shirts-challenged-by-chlck-fil-a. html? _r=O (reporting 
on the publicity relating to the fight between Chick-Fil-A and the Vermont artist's "Eat More 
Kale" T-shirt). 
38 See 15 U.S.C. § l 125(c)(l) (2012) ("Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a 
famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be 
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark 
has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to 
cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury."); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing 
the federal trademark dilution statute). 
:m See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C)(D) (" '[D]ilution by tarnishment' is association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the 
reputation of the famous mark."); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 
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brought an action under dilution law against a defendant for 
tarnishing the distinctiveness of the Louis Vuitton brand by 
adopting "Chewy Vuitton" for cheap dog toys.40 
Blurring use of a brand involves "association arising from the 
similarity between a mark ... and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark," irrespective of "the presence 
or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual 
economic injury."41 In Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, 
Inc., Starbucks brought a blurring dilution claim against the 
defendant for using the term "Charbucks" in connection with the 
defendant's coffee products. 42 To succeed, the brand owner must 
establish, through evidence as required by the statute, that there 
is an association between the two marks.43 
The tarnishment and blurring grounds of dilution, however, are 
only available to marks that have achieved the "famous" status 
under the law.44 Very few trademarks can attain the "famous" 
status, as the law is designed to extend protection only to the 
special trademark that has become "widely recognized by the 
general consuming public" as a source of goods or services.45 In 
other words, a famous mark must be a "household name."46 For 
example, the owner of the trademark Louis Vuitton successfully 
(6th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court decision that "Victor's Little Secret" tarnishes 
the famous trademark Victoria's Secret). 
40 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007). 
Compare id. at 260-61 (finding successful defendant's argument that "Chewy Dog" was a 
parody providing social commentary critical of today's material, status-obsessed consumer 
culture), with V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 605 F.3d at 389 (finding that defendant's mark 
raised a strong inference of tarnishment of plaintiffs brand through lewd or offensive 
sexual association). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(2). 
42 736 F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court's finding that the plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate likelihood of dilution by blurring because the association between 
Starbucks and Charbucks is very weak). 
43 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(lH2). 
44 See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 
2005) ("The judicial consensus is that 'famous' is a rigorous standard."). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (providing that "a mark is famous ifit is widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or 
services of the mark's owner"). 
46 See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
("A famous mark is one that has become a 'household name.'" (quoting Nissan Motor Co. v. 
Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004))). 
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established that the mark is famous for protection under the 
dilution law.47 On the other hand, the trademark COACH for bags 
has recently been found by the court as not sufficiently famous for 
protection under trademark dilution law.48 Despite the COACH 
brand owner's evidence of high volume of sales and advertising 
figures, extensive unsolicited media attention, numerous federal 
registrations, strong demand for joint marketing efforts, and 
positive brand awareness survey results, the court held that the 
evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requisite level of fame for a 
dilution claim.49 
B. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
Most brand owners rely on trademark infringement theory to 
police and enforce their trademark rights against third-party use 
that is likely to cause consumer confusion.50 Under a trademark 
infringement claim, brand owners do not have to prove that they 
own a famous trademark.51 They only need to establish that the 
47 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d at 265 (noting that "LVM owns famous 
marks that are distinctive" is not at issue for dilution claim purpose); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 172-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanding the case for the district court 
to determine whether Rosetta Stone became famous by applying the statutory factors, even 
though Rosetta Stone's brand awareness had reached 75% in 2009). 
<B See Coach Servs., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1373-74 (finding substantial evidence to support 
the conclusion that "CSI failed to show the requisite level of fame for dilution"). 
49 See id. at 1374-76 (analyzing each piece of evidence proffered by Coach and concluding 
that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board did not err in its decision that Coach failed to 
show fame for the dilution claim). 
50 See, e.g., Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., 726 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2013) (featuring a 
competitor seeking a declaratory judgment to prove its mark does not infringe a preexisting 
mark); Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013) (featuring an owner of a 
motivational service business enforcing its right to the term "Own Your Power" against Oprah 
Winfrey); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2013) (featuring 
an owner of the trademark "Sealtight" protecting its product from being confused with a 
product called "Sealtite"); Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (featuring a crystal figuring maker barring a reseller of its product from using its 
name in an advertisement). 
51 See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 
1053 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board's ruling that 
"BEGGIN' STRIPS, although not a famous mark, has enjoyed 'at least a high degree of 
recognition' that has rendered the mark 'distinctive and strong and entitled to a broad level 
of protection'"); Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 
396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[L]ikelihood of confusion fame 'varies along a 
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trademark is distinctive.52 A word, phrase, or symbol can be 
deemed distinctive if it is arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive.53 For 
example, Apple is an arbitrary name for computers, as it has 
absolutely no connection with computers when the brand owner 
selects the word "apple" for computers.54 Clorox is a fanciful 
trademark, because it is a coined term-a made-up, nonexistent 
word when the brand owner creates the mark.55 Polar Bear is a 
suggestive trademark for outerwear, as the mark is "connected 
with the concept of cold weather and protection from the elements. 
It suggests that the type of outerwear and boots sold by [the brand 
owner] offer the sort of protection afforded by bears' skins."56 
Words that describe figure, size, taste, function, or 
characteristic of a product are not inherently distinctive and have 
no protection under trademark law.57 Descriptive trademarks can 
gain protection only if they have acquired secondary meaning, 
becoming distinctive through years of use and achieving consumer 
recognition as source identifiers.58 The burden is on the owner of 
spectrum from very strong to very weak.'" (quoting In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
52 See Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 1312, 1317 
(11th Cir. 2012) ("The starting point for an assessment of the validity of a mark is to query 
whether or not the purported mark is distinctive."); Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 
F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (nothing that distinctive trademarks are entitled to 
protection). 
53 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992). 
M See Icebreaker Ltd. v. Gilmar S.P.A., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1113 (D. Or. 2012) 
(defining "arbitrary trademarks" as "actual words with no connection to the product" and 
listing Apple computers and cancel cigarettes as prime examples) (quoting Entrepreneur 
Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
00 Bear Republic Brewing Co. v. Cent. City Brewing Co., 716 F. Supp. 2d 134, 150 (D. 
Mass. 2010) (noting that "Clorox" is a fanciful trademark). 
oo Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. A.J. Sheepskin & Leather Outerwear, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 896, 904 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding the trademark composing of the word "bear," along with the image 
of a polar bear, a suggestive mark for outerwear and boots). See also Heartland Animal 
Clinic, P.A. v. Heartland SPCA Animal Med. Ctr., LLC, 503 Fed. App'x 616, 619-20 (10th 
Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court's finding that the mark "Heartland" for animal clinic 
services is suggestive); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (a suggestive mark is "deemed inherently 
distinctive and [is] entitled to protection"). 
57 Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that a 
descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive because it "merely describe[s] a function, use, 
characteristic, size, or intended purpose of the product"). 
58 To prove that a descriptive mark has become distinctive or has acquired a "secondary 
meaning," the brand owner must establish that "a substantial number of present or 
prospective customers understand the designation when used in connection with a business 
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the descriptive trademark to demonstrate the acquisition of a 
distinctive secondary meaning through direct evidence of 
consumer survey or indirect evidence such as sale volume, 
advertisement expenditure, and unsolicited media coverage.59 For 
example, Coca-Cola as a name for beverages from the cola nut tree 
has become "the paradigm of a descriptive mark" that has acquired 
distinctiveness.Go 
The owner of an arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive trademark, or 
descriptive trademark with secondary meaning, can assert 
trademark infringement against a third party's use that is likely to 
cause consumer confusion.61 Courts typically apply a list of factors 
in analyzing whether there is likelihood of consumer confusion 
between the brand owner's trademark and the defendant's 
trademark.62 Overall, the likelihood of consumer confusion test is 
factually intensive and costly for brand owners.63 Unfortunately, if 
to refer to a particular person or business enterprise." Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 
915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 
301 F.2d 156, 160--61 (4th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962)); see also George & 
Co. v. Imagination Entm't Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 394 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Descriptive marks are 
not inherently distinctive; rather, they require a sharing of secondary meaning before they 
receive trademark protection." (citing Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ'g, 364 F.3d 535, 
538 (4th Cir. 2004))). 
59 See Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Bos. Beer Co. v. 
Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1993)) (stating that secondary meaning can 
be established "through the use of direct evidence, such as consumer surveys or testimony 
from consumers," or through circumstantial evidence regarding: "(1) the length and manner 
of its use, (2) the nature and extent of advertising and promotion of the mark and (3) the 
efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the public's mind, 
between the name or mark and a particular product or venture."). 
60 Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464. 
G• See, e.g., Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1354-56 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (discussing the relevant factors used in determining the likelihood of consumer 
confusion); Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing 
the factors of consumer confusion and noting that the owner of arbitrary, fanciful, 
suggestive, or descriptive trademarks can assert trademark infringement). 
n2 See Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Melia, Inc., 728 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying the First 
Circuit's "Pignons factors" of (1) similarity of marks, (2) similarity of goods or, in service 
mark cases, services, (3) relationship between parties' channels of trade, (4) juxtaposition of 
parties' advertising, (5) classes of prospective purchasers, (6) evidence of actual confusion, 
(7) defendant's intent in adopting its allegedly infringing mark, and (8) strength of 
plaintiffs mark, in determining likelihood of consumer confusion). 
63 See id. at 66 ("Because the likelihood of confusion analysis is a particularly fact­
intensive one, resolving this issue on summary judgment is disfavored."); Oriental Fin. 
416 GEORGIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 50:399 
the brand owner fails to prosecute a third party's infringing use of 
the protected trademark, there is a strong risk of weakening the 
strength of the trademark64 and losing the trademark rights 
through abandonment.65 
C. UNFAIRCOMPETITION 
The goodwill and reputation associated with a trademark are 
accumulated through years of use and advertisement of the 
trademark in the marketplace.66 Consequently, trademark right is 
based on actual use of the trademark in connection with products 
or services in commerce.67 That also means trademark rights are 
not afforded to those who quickly rush to the United States 
Trademark Office first for registration without actual use of the 
Grp., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Oriental, 698 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that the likelihood of confusion factors test is "a highly fact-intensive inquiry"). 
64 See Taza Sys., LLC v. Taza 21 Co., No. 2:llcv073, 2013 WL 5145859, at *9 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 13, 2013) (recognizing that "the presence of many users in the national marketplace 
could demonstrate that the mark, although valid and enforceable, is weak and entitled to 
limited protection against only exact, or near-exact, third-party uses"). 
65 See Milacron LLC v. Stough Tool Sales, No. 1: 12-CV-119, 2012 WL 2366639, at *3 (S.D. 
Ohio June 21, 2012) (noting that under the trademark statute, "[w]hen any course of 
conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to 
become the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection with which it is used 
or otherwise to lose its significance as a mark," abandonment of the trademark occurs 
without the trademark owner's intent to abandon the trademark). 
66 Courts recognize that brand owners expend significant resources to build the goodwill 
in brands and often take note of the expenditures in fashioning damages in trademark 
infringement and unfair competition cases. See Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F. 
Supp. 452, 476 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) ("[l]n order to calculate damage to a corporation's 
goodwill due to a competitor's false advertising, one must take into account the amount of 
money expended by the injured corporation in the promotion of its trademark."); see also 
Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (observing that the 
district court "noted the significant and 'voluminous' evidence concerning Skydive Arizona's 
'stellar business reputation,' and the hundreds of thousands of dollars Skydive Arizona 
spent in developing and advertising its business in awarding damages"). 
67 See Ross v. Roberts, 478 F. App'x 426, 427 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[O]nly lawful use in 
commerce can establish trademark rights." (citing CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Scis., 474 
F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007))); Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 654 F.3d 
1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Actual substantive rights to a trademark arise based on its 
use in commerce and its distinctiveness."); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus, 
Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a 
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is 
employed.... [T]he right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption."). 
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mark in commerce.68 In fact, registration is not required for 
trademark protection in the United States.69 
To protect the public and the trademark owner's investment in 
a trademark, regardless of registration, unfair competition law 
prevents a third party from using a mark that is likely to cause 
false association or mislead the consumer. 70 In 1946, the Lanham 
Act codified unfair competition law relating to third·party use of 
names, logos, and phrases in sales and advertisements.71 The 
federal unfair competition statute is broad in scope, covering the 
defendant's use of a mark or symbol that causes false 
representation, false advertisement, and misrepresentation of "the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities."72 
68 See In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing the Patent 
Trademark Office's rules about "the trademark owner's rights, which are based on use of 
the mark and identification of the goods, not on the class in which the mark is registered"). 
69 See Gen. Healthcare Ltd. v. Qashat, 364 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Trademark 
rights may arise under either the Lanham Act or under common law, but in either 
circumstance, the right is conditioned upon use in commerce."); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast 
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Trademark ownership is 
always appurtenant to commercial activity. Thus, actual and continuous use is required to 
acquire and retain a protectible interest in a mark."). 
10 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) ("Traditional 
trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition that has its 
sources in English common law, and was largely codified in the Trademark Act of 1946 
(Lanham Act)." (citations omitted)), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1125(c) (2012), as recognized in Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011); Petroliam Nasional 
Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., passed in 1946, codified the then existing common law of trademarks, 
which in turn was based on the tort of unfair competition."). 
1 1 See Schlotzsky's, Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat'l Distrib. Co., 520 F.3d 393, 397 
(5th Cir. 2008) ("The Lanham Act codified and unified the common law on unfair 
competition and trademark protection, and through several amendments since its adoption 
in 1946, remains the principal statutory protection of trademarks."). 
12 15 U.S.C. § l 125(a)(l)(B). The Act provides in pertinent provisions: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fad, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which ­
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or 
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A brand owner, in asserting claims against third-party use of a 
similar mark, can avail to unfair competition law, and in some 
cases, both trademark infringement and unfair competition 
provisions of the Lanham Act. 73 Courts apply the same likelihood 
of consumer confusion test in trademark infringement to unfair 
competition cases.74 If the evidence warrants it, courts do not 
hesitate to uphold verdicts with large damages against defendants 
for intentionally harming the goodwill and reputation of the 
plaintiffs trademark through false or misleading representation 
and advertisement.75 
In addition to federal claims, brand owners can look to state law 
for unfair competition against third parties for engaging in passing 
off or palming off the goodwill of the trademark. 76 For instance, 
under New York state law of unfair competition, courts recognize 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
Id. § 1125(a). 
73 See, e.g., Secular Orgs. for Sobriety, Inc. v. lllirich, 213 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(noting that the plaintiff asserted both trademark infringement and unfair competition 
claims against the defendant); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911, 914 
(2d Cir. 1998) (same). 
14 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) ("[T]he test for liability is likelihood of confusion: '[U]nder the Lanham Act 
[§ 43(a)], the ultimate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the 
similarity of the marks.... Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition 
or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there a 'likelihood of confusion?'" 
(citation omitted)); Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e use the 
same test to decide whether there has been trademark infringement, unfair competition, or 
false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the two marks."). 
75 See Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Quattrocchi, 673 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding a 
jury verdict of $10 million in damages in a trademark infringement and false advertisement 
case). 
76 See, e.g., Automobili Lamborghini, S.p.A. v. Sangiovese, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-1154-KJD­
CWH, 2013 WL 5371421, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 24, 2013) (enforcing an injunction that 
prohibited "engaging in any activity constituting unfair competition with Lamborghini, or 
constituting an infringement of any or all of Lamborghini's Marks, or of Lamborghini's 
rights in, or to use or exploit, any or all of Lamborghini's Marks or engage in any activity 
that deceives the public and/or the trade, including, without limitation, palming-off or the 
use of design elements and designations associated with Lamborghini or Lamborghini's 
marks"). 
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both palming off and misappropriation. 77 New York defines 
"palming off' as "the sale of the goods of one manufacturer as 
those of another."78 New York law even extends protection to 
brands that have no secondary meaning, as long as there is 
evidence of a third party's intent to trade off on the goodwill and 
reputation of the name.79 Obviously, in state unfair competition 
cases, the brand owner must establish that it suffers losses 
directly from the defendant's palming-off conduct.so 
In summary, a brand owner can rely on trademark dilution, 
trademark infringement, and unfair competition law to police and 
enforce its trademark rights against third-party use to protect its 
substantial investment in building the goodwill in the brand. 
D. TRADEMARK LITIGATION COSTS 
Brand owners, relying on federal and state law to protect and 
enforce their rights in brands, incur significant costs in trademark 
litigation. According to the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association's 2013 Report of the Economic Survey, average 
litigation costs in 2012 for a trademark litigation ranged from 
$375,000 when less than $1 million was in controversy to $2 
n See Yantha v. Omni Childhood Ctr., Inc., No. 13-CV-1948, 2013 WL 5327516, at *6 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2013) ("New York recognizes two theories of common-law unfair 
competition: palming off and misappropriation."); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 341 N.E.2d 
817, 820 (N.Y. 1975) ("The essence of an unfair competition claim is that the defendant 
assembled a product which bears so striking a resemblance to the plaintiffs product that 
the public will be confused as to the identity of the products."). 
1s ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 858 (N.Y. 2007) (footnote omitted) 
(" 'Palming off-that is, the sale of the goods of one manufacturer as those of another-was 
the first theory of unfair competition endorsed by New York courts, and 'has been 
extended ... to situations where the parties are not even in competition." (quoting 
Electrolux Corp. v. ValWorth, Inc., 161 N.E.2d 197, 203 (N.Y. 1959))). 
79 See Lincoln Rest. Corp. v. Wolfies Rest. Inc., 291 F.2d 302, 303 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating 
that even without secondary meaning, "intent to trade on plaintiffs' reputation and 
plaintiffs' name was specifically found, and we see no distinction between this and ordinary 
'palming off "). 
BO See Barbagallo v. Marcum LLP, 820 F. Supp. 2d 429, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that 
the plaintiff must show "that defendant diverted plaintiffs customers and business"); Coca­
Cola N. Am. v. Crawley Juice, Inc., No. 09 CV 3259, 2011 WL 1882845, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 
17, 2011) (requiring that, to state a claim for unfair competition, a plaintiff must allege 
either a "direct financial loss, lost dealings, or ... [lost] profits resulting from the 
'anticompetitive acts' at issue" (quoting CA, Inc. v. Simple.Corn, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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million when more than $25 million was in controversy.81 The 
costs include "outside and local counsel, associates, paralegal 
services, travel and living expenses, fees and costs for court 
reporters, copies, couriers, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, 
expert witnesses, translators, surveys, jury advisors, and similar 
expenses."82 
To limit harms to the goodwill of a trademark and to control 
litigation costs, many brand owners often seek a preliminary 
injunction in the early stages of trademark litigation.83 A 
preliminary injunction serves two purposes. First, brand owners 
want to stop as early as possible the harms to the goodwill of the 
brand inflicted by unauthorized third-party use of the brand. The 
injury is irreparable because there is already a likelihood of 
consumer confusion as to the source of the products or services.84 
Damages to the goodwill of the brand are difficult to measure, and 
monetary damages are inadequate to make the brand owner whole 
again when the harms occur.85 A preliminary injunction can curb 
the harms prior to trial.86 Second, the costs incurred at the 
preliminary injunction stage are significantly less than those 
81 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY (2013), http://www.pat 
entinsurance.com/custdocs/2013AIPLA%20survey.pdf. 
s2 Id. 
83 See Meredith Wilkes & Anna E. Raimer, Preliminary Injunctwns in U.S. Trademark 
Infringement Cases and the Presumption of Irreparable Harm, 68(3) INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N 
BUU.. (INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N), Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/Preli 
rninarylnjunctionsinUSTrademarklnfringementCasesandthePresumptionoflrreparableHarm. 
aspx (detailing grounds for a preliminary injunction, including different approaches to show 
irreparable harm). 
84 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctwns Against Trademark Infringement 
Getting Harder to Achieve?, 14 !NTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 4-5 (2009) ("Like trying to un-ring a 
bell, trying to use dollars to 'compensate' after the fact for damage to business goodwill and 
reputation cannot constitute fair or full compensation. Damage to business reputation and 
good will is inherently 'irreparable.'"). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1 ("Getting a preliminary injunction means that the trademark owner can force 
the alleged infringer to immediately stop all use of the challenged mark and undergo an 
expensive change to a significantly different mark. That change will last for the months or 
years that will ensue until all the issues can be hashed out in a full-fledged trial on the 
merits. In some situations, getting a preliminary injunction means that the trademark 
owner will immediately receive just about all the relief it would be entitled to even after a 
win on the merits at trial."). 
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incurred when the case proceeds to trial.87 The majority of cases 
settle after the issuance of a preliminary injunction before trial, 
reducing litigation costs.88 
E. TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 
The anti-dilution, infringement, and unfair competition causes 
of action are also available to trade dress. Trade dress is the total 
look and feel, appearance, or image of a product or service.89 For 
example, in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, the Supreme Court 
extended the protection available to trademarks under the 
Lanham Act to the look and feel of a fast food restaurant.90 As 
long as a trade dress is inherently distinctive and non-functional,91 
it enjoys the same protection available to trademarks.92 Indeed, 
the owner of a trade dress can seek injunctive relief and damages 
in the form of defendant's profits and enhanced damages for willful 
87 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. Ass'N, supra note 81 (showing that the costs of trademark 
litigation at the end of the full survey are less than going to trial, indicating that costs at 
preliminary injunction are even less). 
88 Anthony DiSarro, A Farewell To Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in 
Constitutional Litigation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 743, 746--47 n.8 (2012). 
89 See Trade Dress, INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.orgffrademark 
Basics/FastSheets/Pagesffrade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall image (look and feel) 
of a product and distinguishes it from those of others."). 
90 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (affirming the Fifth Circuit's finding that Taco Cabana's trade 
dress was inherently distinctive and required no secondary meaning, thereby providing 
protection to Taco Cabana's "look and feel"). See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Should It Be 
a Free for All? The Challenge of Extending Trade Dress Protection to the Look and Feel of 
Web Sites in the Evolving Internet, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1233 (2000) (discussing the grounds 
and challenges associated with extending trade dress law to protect websites). 
s1 "Substantively, the trade dress must be both distinctive ... and nonfunctional (i.e., not 
be essential to the use of purpose of, and not affect the cost or quality of, the product or 
service) [to be registerable]. Functional trade dress is not registerable ...." Trade Dress, 
supra note 89; see, e.g., Fruit-Ices Corp. v. Coolbrands Int'!, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 412 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the plaintiffs trade dress for frozen fruit bars is entitled to 
protection, because it is inherently distinctive and non-functional). Mattel, Inc. v. MGA 
Entm't, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (articulating the established test of 
inherently distinctive trade dress). 
92 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (stating that there is no distinction under the Lanham Act 
for the protection of inherently distinctive trademarks and trade dress); see also 
Aromatique, Inc. v. Gold Seal, Inc., 28 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The difference 
between trade dress and trademark is no longer of importance in determining whether 
trade dress is protected by federal law. Trade dress, regardless of whether it is registered, 
is protectable under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)."). 
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infringement of the trade dress.93 The seminal decision in Two 
Pesos expands legal protection to new trade dress, ranging from 
the look and feel of a website94 to packaging designs for crayons.95 
As with trademarks, an owner of a trade dress can seek 
registration of the trade dress with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.96 
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR BRANDING CONTENT 
Copyright law protects original content fixed in a tangible 
medium.97 As long as the content contains a modicum of 
creativity, the content is eligible for copyright protection.98 The 
duration of copyright protection is significantly long. For example, 
93 See Djarum v. Dhanraj Imports, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669-70 (W.D.N.C. 2012) 
(ordering a permanent injunction, disgorgement of the defendant's profits, and treble 
damages against the defendant in a case where the defendant had intentionally infringed 
the plaintiffs trade dress for a cigar packaging design). 
94 See Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, 
at *21 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2010) (recognizing trade dress protection for the plaintiffs website 
upon observing that "[l]ike the packaging of a product, the look and feel of a web site invites 
the user in. It offers a familiar interface, with recognizable element.'!. Similar colors, sizes, 
and layouts make navigation and interaction facile."); Blue Nile, Inc. v. Ice.com, Inc., 478 F. 
Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (W.D. Wash. 2007) ("[D]efendant has cited no authority for proposition 
that plaintiff cannot qualify its trade dress description as one seeking protection for the 
'look and feel' of its website in response to a motion to dismiss."). 
95 See Rose Art Indus., Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
"each line having its own distinctive packaging, and if the packaging of each line has its 
own 'consistent overall look,' then the packaging of each line would constitute recognizable 
trade dress regardless of whether the packaging of the three lines together have a 
'consistent overall look' and regardless of whether some crayons were packaged in other 
types of packaging"). 
oo See Aromatique, 28 F.3d at 868 (noting that the trade dress in the present case had 
been registered and therefore enjoyed all the benefits available for registered trademarks). 
Registration of a distinctive trade dress prohibits trade dress that is "as a whole functional" 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e}. McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 756 F.3d 307, 
310 (4th Cir. 2014). 
97 The 1976 Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret 
Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2014) (comparing copyright protection to 
different types of intellectual property). 
98 Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product 
Differentiation & Copyright Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1910 (2014) (stating that in a 
vast majority of cases, copyright protection is available if a work is "merely to be 
independently created rather than copied, and ... exhibit[sJ a modicum of creativity, one 
small enough to be present" (footnote omitted)). 
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the term of copyright protection for individual authors is the life of 
the author plus seventy years.99 For entity authors who hire 
others to create works of authorship, the duration is ninety-five 
years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is 
shorter. 100 Ownership of a copyright means having a bundle of 
exclusive rights, including the exclusive right to make copies, 
prepare derivative works, distribute the works, publicly perform 
the work, and publicly display the work. 101 Copyright owners can 
bring infringement litigation against others for violation of any of 
the exclusive rights. 
Branding content in traditional mediums such as billboards, 
catalogs, flyers, newspapers, and trade journals is protected under 
copyright law. 102 This content is typically in the form of 
photographs, collages, or combinations of pictures and text in 
prints. 103 The content, of course, often includes the name of the 
brand, logos, or phrases. The arrival of the Internet has 
revolutionized branding content and the means to deliver content 
in recent years. 104 Online branding content is now a combination 
99 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 
MICH. L. REV. 231, 261 (2014) (recognizing the "extremely long duration of copyright 
protection" and proposing different packages of terms of protection, with the minimum 
package having a very short minimum term of one to five years and the maximum package 
having the "maximum terms of 70 years plus life, 120 years from creation, or 95 years from 
publication"); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 222­
43 (tracing the history of the duration of copyright protection after the life of the author). 
100 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012); see also Joshua L. Simmons, Inventions Made For Hire, 2 
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 6-7 (2012) (discussing works made for hire under 
copyright law). 
101 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing the exclusive rights); R.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 
(1976) ("These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called 'bundle of rights' that is a 
copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases."); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, 
Love's Labor's Lost: Marry for Love, Copyright Work Made-for-Hire, and Alienate at Your 
Leisure, 101 KY. L.J. 113, 117-18 (2013) (discussing copyright ownership). 
102 See, e.g., Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(exemplifying protection of branding content in catalogs under copyright law); Kleier 
Adver., Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir. 1990) (in billboards); 
Inkadinkado, Inc. v. Meyer, No. CIV.A. 03-10332-GAO, 2003 WL 22282177, at *3 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 16, 2003) (in collages). 
103 See, e.g., Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 2007); Gener-Villar v. Adcom 
Grp., Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 112, 126 (D. P.R. 2008). 
10~ See BARNARD, supra note 20 (noting that globally, the Internet continues to dominate 
as the medium of choice for advertisements). 
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of software, images, and text. 105 A video clip advertisement to be 
delivered via smartphones or desktops is one example of such a 
combination. 106 A game created for advertisement purposes is 
another example of multimedia, interactive software.107 Yet 
another example of the software-images-text combination is an 
app designed to build brand loyalty. 108 Branding content has 
proliferated with the explosion of mobile devices in addition to the 
widely available, ubiquitous desktop computer. 109 
In summary, branding serves to build the goodwill in a brand, 
name, or logo. Trademark law extends protection to the brands, 
for purposes of protecting both the consumer and the brand 
owner's investment.no Copyright law protects the branding 
content, whether such content is a photograph, collage, video 
game, software, or some combination thereof.lll Enforcement costs 
105 See Scott Scanlon, The Ultimate List of Content Curation Tools and Platforms, 
YOUBRAND, http://www.youbrandinc.com/ultimate-lists/ultimate-list-content-curation-tools· 
platform/ (last updated Nov. 2, 2012) (listing various online sources that facilitate curation 
ofcontent to aid marketing strategy). 
106 See, e.g., Elisha Hartwig, The Art of the Branded Video, MAsHABLE (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://mashable.com/2013/11/29/video-views-completion-metrics/#OOE4nxqL_aql (describing 
the importance of a video that resonates with the audience in building a brand); Liza 
Brown, How to Add Logo to Video Quickly and Easily, WONDERSHARE (Apr. 28, 2015, 8:29 
PM), http://www.wondershare.com/video-editing-tips/add-logo-to-video.html ("[P]eople in 
today's world tend to distinguish themselves in various ways, including the video 
creation."); Mark Montgomery, Branding with Bugs, VIDEOMAKER (Mar. 1, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.videomaker.com/article/14602-branding-with-bugs (describing the importance of 
the addition of bugs, "graphical element[s] that usually display[] in or around a given 
corner of the viewable area of the video," to videos for branding purposes). 
107 See Steve Hicks, Does the Video Game Industry Hold the Keys to the Future of 
Advertising? Engage Consumers via Brain Chemistry, ADWEEK (Feb. 6, 2014, 11:04 AM), 
http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/engage-consumers-brain-chemistry-155 
531 ("The next generation of marketing innovation belongs, not to those who bring their 
advertising to the game, but to those who know how to bring the game to their 
advertising."). 
10s See e.g., Your Branding, ANDROID DEVELOPERS, http://www.androiddocs.com/designlst 
yle/branding.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2016) (describing the different styles available for 
branding in an Android app). 
109 See BARNARD, supra note 20 ("Mobile advertising (by which we mean all internet ads 
delivered to smartphones and tablets, whether display, classified or search, and including 
in-app ads) has now only taken off and is growing six times faster than desktop internet."). 
110 See Sonia K. Katya!, Trademark lntersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1616 (2010) 
("[T]rademark law protects a brand's proprietary, source-identifying function."). 
111 See Meghan L. Collins, Still Standing, New Branding: Corporate Crossroads of 
Shaping a Modern Brand While Protecting Intellectual Property, 17 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 197, 219 
(2015) (stating that "copyright law protects creative works" of brand). 
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relating to brands under both trademark and copyright laws 
typically command a high monetary sum. 112 
V. TAX TREATMENT OF BRAND BUII..DINGAND ENFORCEMENT 
A. GENERAL TAX FRAMEWORK 
In business, one must spend money to make money. Tax rules 
recognize this, and permit deductions for certain outlays: 
The income tax is ostensibly a tax on net income. That 
is, it only attempts to tax the net increase in wealth 
generated by money making activities. This implies 
that we should be entitled to deduct the money we 
spend from the money we make before we apply the 
tax rates to the remainder. In general this is what the 
tax rules try to do. 113 
For the most part, the key rules for deducting expenses arising 
from money-making efforts are straightforward. Section 162 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code) authorizes the deduction of ordinary 
and necessary expenses arising from the carrying on of any trade 
or business. 114 Additionally, section 212 authorizes the deduction 
of ordinary and necessary expenses related to investment 
activities. 115 But there are some interesting complexities in 
11 2 For trademark and copyright infringement cases, if the controversy is less than $1 
million, the cost of litigation for each case is about $375,000. The cost will double if the 
controversy is above $1 million. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N, supra note 81. 
I l3 See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION: 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 95 (3d ed. 2013). For example, a business that is conducted 
through the activities of its employees is entitled to deduct the reasonable salaries of those 
employees from its gross income in determining its taxable income. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (West 
Supp. 2015). 
111 I.R.C. § 162. Since the inception of the modern income tax, the Code has permitted a 
current deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 
16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 ("[I]n computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax 
there shall be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying 
on any business ... ."). 
11 5 I.R.C. § 212. The need for a separate provision addressing investment activities arose 
from an early Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that buying and selling 
stocks and other investment activities did not constitute a trade or business, and therefore, 
what is now section 162 did not apply to the expenses arising from those activities. Higgins 
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reaching a fair result with respect to business and investment 
deductions.HG Most notably, since the inception of the modern 
income tax, the Code has precluded a current deduction for so­
called "capital expenditures." 117 
A point of importance lies in understanding how deductible 
"expenses" differ from nondeductible "capital expenditures." In 
general, an immediately deductible expense is a cost that benefits 
the current year only .118 A nondeductible capital expenditure is a 
cost that benefits more than the current year. 119 Thus, for 
example, when a business chooses to license trademark rights 
from a third party, the annual royalty paid can be deducted 
immediately since it only helps produce income in the current 
year.120 On the other hand, when a business buys a trademark for 
use in its business, the cost of the trademark is a capital 
expenditure that cannot be deducted in the current year, because 
v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 218 (1941). Congress responded by enacting what is now section 
212 to allow for the deduction of those expenses. 
116 This area is inherently complex. An area of continuing development and uncertainty is 
the meaning and application of the phrase "ordinary and necessary" as used in the statute. In 
Welch u. Heluering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933), the seminal case interpreting that phrase, 
the Supreme Court held that to be "ordinary," the expense must be customary or expected in 
the life of the business. See al.so Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) ("Ordinary has 
the connotation of normal, usual or customary."). The term "necessary" was interpreted by the 
Court in Welch to mean "appropriate and helpful" Welch, 290 U.S. at 113. 
Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations define the term "trade or business." In 
considering the meaning of the term, the Supreme Court has generally concluded that to be 
engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in. the activity with continuity 
and regularity, and the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for 
income or profit. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). Whether a taxpayer has 
engaged in the requisite scope of activities and has demonstrated the requisite profit motive 
are questions to be determined by the facts in each case. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217. 
117 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § Il(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing "[t]hat no deduction 
shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent improvements, or 
betterments, made to increase the value of any property"). For the current disallowance 
provisions, see LR.C. § 263(a). 
11s See I.R.C. § 162(a) (stating that expenses "paid or incurred during the taxable year" are 
deductible (emphasis added)). 
119 See Capital Asset Costs Are Not Deductible as Business Expenses, BUSINESS OWNER'S 
TOOLKIT (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkitlsbg/tax-infolfed·taxes/cost-of-cap 
ital-assets-not·deductible-expense.aspx ("A capital asset is an asset that benefits your 
business for more than one year."). 
120 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (including "other payments required to be made as a condition to 
the continued use of possession" as a deductible expense). 
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the trademark will help produce income over many years. 12 1 As 
illustrated, even an expenditure that is clearly for the purpose of 
making money may not be currently deductible if the expenditure 
will help produce mcome over a longer period of time than the 
current year. 
Distinguishing immediately deductible expenses from 
nondeductible capital expenditures can be difficult. Throughout 
the years, the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the law in 
this area, often creating further controversy and confusion in the 
process. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, the 
Supreme Court concluded that an expenditure that serves to 
create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must be 
capitalized.122 The Court noted: 
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have 
some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses 
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond 
the taxable year. What is important and controlling, 
we feel, is that the ... payment serves to create or 
enhance for [the taxpayer] what is essentially a 
separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an 
inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in 
nature and not an expense....123 
In a later decision, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the 
Supreme Court minimized the importance of the separate-and­
distinct-asset test of Lincoln Savings and expanded the test for 
121 If the costs incurred to purchase a trademark were deductible in full in the current 
year, there would be a mismatching of income and expense that produced such income; 
income would be understated in the year of acquisition and overstated in later years. By 
prohibiting the immediate deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided. It 
should be noted that the purchaser will recover its costs for the trademark over time 
through amortization deductions. LR.C. § 197, discussed infra notes 140-44 and 
accompanying text. 
122 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971). See generally Alan Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital 
Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443 (1974) 
(discussing the court's decision in Lincoln Savings). 
12a 403 U.S. at 354. 
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capitalization. 124 The Supreme Court used broad language to 
emphasize that any expenditure producing benefits beyond the 
current taxable year may require capitalization. 125 As noted 
above, the Supreme Court had previously held that an expenditure 
that serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must 
be capitalized. 126 In INDOPCO, the Court held that, although the 
separate-and-distinct-asset standard is a sufficient condition for 
capitalization, it is not a necessary condition, and an expenditure 
giving rise to benefits may require capitalization, whether or not 
the expenditure gives rise to a separate and distinct asset. 121 
INDOPCO did not involve an expenditure relating to 
branding. 128 As most costs associated with branding produce 
benefits in current and future years, such costs would seemingly 
fall within the expansive thrust of INDOPCO and would be 
required to be capitalized. 129 Branding is inherently designed to 
124 503 U.S. 79, 86--90 (1992). The taxpayer in INDOPCO, a publicly-held corporation 
incurred expenses (various investment banker, lega~ and consulting fees) in connection 
with a friendly merger offer from another company. The taxpayer sought to deduct the fees 
as current expenses. The Court held the fees were not currently deductible, but rather had 
to be capitalized under section 263. Id. at 90. 
12s The Supreme Court noted: 
Although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit ... may not 
warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year 
in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in 
determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction 
or capitalization .... Indeed, the text of the Code's capitalization provision, 
§263(a)(l), which refers to "permanent improvements or betterments," itself 
envisions an inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits realized by 
the taxpayer. 
Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the 
transaction (merger) produced significant benefits that would be realized by the taxpayer, 
or by the merged entity, in future years. Id. at 88. 
12s Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354. 
121 INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87-88. "It by no means follows, however, that only 
expenditures that create or enhance separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under 
section 263." Id. at 86--87. 
12s INDOPCO involved various investment banking, legal, and consulting expenditures 
related to the merger. Id. at 81-82. 
129 A number of pre-INDOPCO cases held that certain costs associated with trademarks 
and trade names should be capitalized, but INDOPCO seemingly required almost all costs 
associated with trademarks and trade names to be capitalized, including costs, such as 
ordinary brand advertising costs, that were previously viewed as deductible. See, e.g., 
Georator Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 283, 286--87 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding that the 
costs of protecting a trademark from cancellation must be capitalized), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 
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produce future benefits for a business.13° Costs of developing 
brands often produce benefits that give rise to distinctive 
intellectual property assets such as trade dress, trademarks, trade 
names, and copyrights that continue well beyond the current 
taxable year. 131 Legal costs of enforcing brands secure these 
benefits; specifically, such costs can increase the value of brands 
and make a taxpayer's interest in them more secure by 
eliminating the possibility of having the taxpayer's brand impaired 
by competitors and by deterring attempts to have the taxpayer's 
legal rights in brands challenged. 132 
If capitalization-in contrast to current expensing-is required 
for any costs associated with branding, the tax query would then 
shift to whether such costs may be recovered over time through tax 
depreciation deductions. In an economic sense, depreciation is the 
decline in value of an asset due to wear and tear and 
obsolescence. 133 In the tax sense, depreciation is a deduction from 
income to permit the taxpayer to recover the cost of that asset. 134 
If we seek to match our capital expenditures against the revenues 
they helped produce, we must spread out the deduction over the 
u~eful life of the asset. 135 The problem with many intellectual 
property assets produced from branding activities, such as 
trademarks, trade names, and goodwill, is that they do not have a 
determinable useful life over which capitalized costs may be 
recovered. For this reason, trademarks, trade names, goodwill, 
and other intangible assets with indeterminate lives were viewed 
945 (1974); Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331F.2d360, 361 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the costs 
of trademark infringement litigation must be capitalized). 
1:io See generally discus.'lion supra Part II. 
131 See generally discussion supra Part III. 
132 See, e.g., supra notes 83-88, 93 and accompanying text (illustrating how litigation 
intended to protect brands through various means can increase broad value). 
"~1 See A Brief Overview of 1'ax Depreciation, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Busi 
nesses-&-Self-Employed!A-Brief-Overview-of-Depreciation (last visited Jan. 2, 2016) (stating 
that tax deductions for depreciation are an "annual allowance for the wear and tear, 
deterioration, or obsolescence ofthe property"). 
1:11 Id. ("Depreciation is an income tax deduction that allows a taxpayer to rework the cost 
of other basis of certain property ... for the wear and tear, deterioration, or obsoleseence of 
the property."). 
135 Hertz Corp. v. United States, 364 U.S. 122, 126 (1960) ("[T]he purpose of depreciation 
accounting is to allocate the expense of using an asset to the various periods which are 
benefited by that asset."). 
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as nondepreciable assets at the time of the INDOPCO decision in 
1992.136 
On occasion, Congress has carved out limited statutory 
exceptions for trademarks and trade names (but not goodwill), 
permitting recovery of certain costs through annual deductions. 
Between 1956 and 1986, for instance, Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code to allow a taxpayer to elect to depreciate 
over five years certain costs incurred in connection with the 
acquisition, protection, expansion, registration, or defense of a 
trademark. 137 Between 1969 and 1993, Congress allowed the cost 
of certain acquired trademarks and trade names to be amortized 
over either ten or twenty-five years, depending on the 
circumstances. 138 Yet when these special depreciation rules were 
136 Under early tax depreciation rules, an intangible asset was subject to a depreciation 
allowance if it was "known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business or in 
the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which may be estimated 
with reasonable accuracy... ." Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004). An 
intangible asset, the useful life of which was not determinable, was not subject to the 
allowance for depreciation. Id. Under this framework, patents and copyrights were 
considered depreciable, but trademarks, trade names, and goodwill were not. See Gen. 
Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D. Minn. 1978) ("Where the useful 
life of an intangible asset is clearly limited to a defined period as is the case with patents 
and copyrights, depreciation is available without question ...." (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1. l 7(a)­
3)), affd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979). 
137 Congress enacted section 177 in 1956. Act of June 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-629, § 4(a), 
70 Stat. 404, 406 (1956). Before enactment of section 177, expenditures paid in connection 
with trademarks and trade names, such as legal fees, were not currently deductible and 
were not recoverable under early tax depreciation rules, because trademarks and trade 
names have indeterminable useful lives. S. REP. No. 84-191, at 8 (1956). Certain large 
corporations, which had in-house legal staff handling trademark and trade name matters, 
avoided this result by deducting compensation with respect to these matters because of 
difficulties of identification. Id. Smaller companies, which could not afford to maintain 
their own legal staff, had to pay outside counsel or consultants to perform functions related 
to trademarks and trade names and were required to capitalize such expenses. Id. at 8-9. 
Section 177 was enacted as an attempt to eliminate the existing hardship and inequities 
facing small corporations. Id. Section 177 was repealed in 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 241(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2181 (1986). The tax rule for trademark and 
trade name expenditures was viewed as inappropriate for a number of reasons: the 
possibility that large companies were finding a way to deduct otherwise capital 
expenditures did not justify an amortization election for all; a five-year amortization only 
partially alleviated any unfairness; and there was no basis for a presumption that 
investment in trademarks and trade names produced social benefits that market forces 
might adequately reflect. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 256 (1985). 
138 Section 1253, enacted in 1969, provided a new set of tax rules governing acquisitions of 
trademarks and trade names. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 1253, 83 Stat. 
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not in force or were inapplicable, capitalized trademark and trade 
name costs were not depreciable, as trademarks and trade names 
have indeterminate lives. 139 
In 1993, a year after INDOPCO was decided, Congress, in a 
major shift in tax policy, enacted section 197 to simplify the law 
and minimize disputes regarding the depreciation of intangibles. 140 
Section 197 provides a single depreciation method (straight line 
depreciation) and a single recovery period (fifteen years) for the 
487, 647-48 (1969). Section 1253 provided that a trademark transferee could amortize a 
lump sum payment over the lesser of the term of the trademark agreement if the agreement 
had a limited term often years. See I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2) (1969) (providing for amortization of 
the cost of a trademark or trade name if, pursuant to section 1253(a), the transfer of the 
trademark was not treated as a sale or exchange of a capital asset). In 1989, Congress 
amended section 1253, limiting the ten-year amortization rule for lump sum amounts to 
transactions in which the lump sum amount paid did not exceed $100,000, and providing a 
new twenty-five year amortization period for fixed sum amounts exceeding $100,000. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7622(a)-(c), 103 Stat. 
2106, 2377-78. 
139 Mary LaFrance, Days of Our Lives: The Impact of Section 197 on the Depreciation of 
Copyrights, Patents, and Related Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 321 (1995). 
1<0 See id. at 320 ("Congress enacted section 197 in order to simplify the rules for 
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of controversies arising from the need to 
determine which intangibles are depreciable and what their recovery periods should be."). 
One problem with the historic tax regime for intangibles was that it caused much litigation 
concerning the identification of intangible assets and their useful lives. See id. (stating that 
the vagueness of the standard for determining intangibles "led to frequent administrative 
appeals and litigation"). Of course, taxpayers who had the resources to litigate over the 
identification, valuation, and establishment of limited useful lives of intangibles were better 
off than those taxpayers who lacked resources. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
103D CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 147 
(Comm. Print 1993) (explaining that Congress created section 197 to eliminate considerable 
confusion over the federal tax treatment of amortizable intangible assets); see also 
Catherine L. Hammond, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: § 197 of the Internal 
Revenue Code Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918 (1995) ("Because the 
determination of whether an intangible can be amortized was a question of fact, the 
outcome of such litigation varied widely according to the circumstances of each particular 
case."). Another problem stemmed from the fact that the rule for recovering costs of 
acquired intangible assets differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for 
recovering the costs of acquired tangible assets. This disparate treatment between 
intangible and tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to taxpayers. See Kevin 
R. Conzelmann, Amortization of Intangibles, 533-2d TAX MGMT. PORT. A-3 & n.7 (2001) 
(detailing the distortions caused by treating intangible and tangible assets differently); 
Allen W album, Depreciation of Intangibles: An Area of the Tax Law in Need of Change, 30 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453, 454-56 (1993) (explaining that the inequity between similarly 
situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which unnecessarily 
burdened the administration of tax law). 
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capitalized costs associated with many types of intangible assets, 
including trademarks, trade names, and goodwill.141 The fifteen­
year recovery period was not based on any measure of actual 
usefulness of intangibles in a business but was chosen because it 
was the shortest period that would not have a negative revenue 
impact. 142 Although not all types of intangibles are subject to 
section 197, 143 fifteen-year amortization appears to be accepted by 
the government as the appropriate rule for most intangibles. 
Indeed, a decade after section 197's enactment, the Treasury 
Department established a fifteen-year safe harbor amortization 
period for intangibles that do not fall within the scope of section 
197 and that do not have readily ascertainable lives. 144 
From a policy perspective, capitalizing and amortizing branding 
expenditures-as opposed to expensing such costs all at once­
fulfills the government's goal of trying to match, for tax accounting 
141 l.R.C. § 197(a). Although most self-created intangible assets are specifically excluded 
from the rule, self-created trademarks and trade names are included. See id. § 197(c)(2), 
(d}(l}(F) (including "any franchise, trademark, or trade name"); Treas. Reg. § l.197­
2(b)(10)(d)(2) (as worded in 2011) (same); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 684 (1993), 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1373 (stating that "the capitalized costs incurred in 
connection with the development or registration of a trademark or trade name are to be 
amortized over the 14-year period"). For purposes of section 197, a trademark includes "any 
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, adopted and used to identify 
goods or services and distinguish them from those provided by others." Treas. Reg.§ l.197­
2(b)(10). A trade name includes "any name used to identify or designate a particular trade 
or business or the name or title used by a person or organization engaged in a trade or 
business." Id. A trademark or trade name includes "any trademark or trade name arising 
under statute or applicable common law, and any similar right obtained by contract." Id. 
142 See Gregory M. Beil, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy 
Over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 733-34 
(1995) (describing section 197 as a "simple solution" to the uncertainty of the prior regime). 
For an argument that the fifteen-year period is too short, see Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the 
Life for Acquired Intangibles to 75 Years, 135 TAX NOTES 1053, 1053--54 (2012). 
143 For example, section 197 does not apply to any interest in a patent, patent application, 
copyright, or computer software that is not acquired as part of a purchase of a trade or 
business. I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(3)(A)(ii}, (e)(4); Treas. Reg. § l.197-2(c)(7). The government has 
chosen different tax depreciation rules for these separately acquired intellectual property 
assets. See Treas. Reg. §§ l.167(a)-4(a)-(b) (explaining treatment of computer software); 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 
757 (2003) (defining computer software as property subject to section 197); JEFFREY A. 
MAINE & XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION: TRANSACTION AND 
LITIGATION ISSUES 5-27 to 5-41 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining the types of intellectual property 
covered under Section 197). 
144 Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-3(b). 
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purposes, the cost of an asset to the income stream that the asset 
produced. 145 Concededly, the pace of amortization chosen by the 
government-fifteen years-is arbitrary. To achieve accurate tax 
accounting, the pace of amortization would be the period of time 
that the asset produces income in the taxpayer's business. 146 The 
government, however, has historically abandoned the concept of 
determinable useful life in calculating the proper annual 
depreciation allowance to achieve goals other than sound 
accounting practice. 147 Fifteen-year amortization appears to be an 
accepted political compromise between a current deduction and no 
deductions at all. 
Fifteen-year amortization applies only to branding costs that 
are chargeable to capital account and not otherwise currently 
deductible. 148 This brings us back to the initial question of 
whether branding costs should be capitalized in the first instance. 
The "significant future benefit" approach adopted in INDOPCO 
seemingly required the capitalization of branding expenditures, as 
most branding expenditures give rise to long-term future benefits. 
But since the Supreme Court's decision in 1992, there have been a 
number of government responses and tax cases carving out 
Mo See Ma&'!ey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960) ("It is the primary 
purpose of depreciation accounting to further the integrity of periodic income statements by 
making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use ... of the asset to the periods 
to which it contributes."). 
HG Id. at 10&-07 (concluding that "useful life" must be tied to the time the business is 
expected to use the asset, because such approach is "more likely to reflect correctly the 
actual cost"). 
w See Simon v. Comm'r, 68 F.3d 41, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining the government's 
abandonment of the useful life concept). It is also worth noting that in 1980, Congress 
developed a set of arbitrary recovery periods for tangible assets used in business. See also 
Economic Tax Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 207-19 (1981) 
(detailing the various recovery periods). The pre-set recovery periods eliminated the need 
for useful lire and thus simplified the depreciation rules for tangible assets. See Sinwn, 68 
F.3d at 45 (explaining that under the arbitrary recovery periods "the purpose served by the 
determinable useful life requirement ... no longer exists"). These periods were usually 
shorter than the useful life of the tangible assets, encouraging investment in such assets 
and stimulating economic growth. See id. (explaining that the arbitrary recovery periods 
allow recovery of the cost of an asset over a period usually shorter than the asset's useful 
life, and that the accordingly simplified depreciation rules stimulated investment). 
148 See I.R.C. § 197(b) (~Except as provided in subsection (a), no depreciation or 
amortization deduction shall be allowable with respect to any amortizable Section 197 
intangible."); Treas. Reg.§ L197-2(a)(3). 
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INDOPCO exceptions for, and permitting expensing of, certain 
branding-related costs. 149 As noted in the sections below, current 
tax rules now permit expensing of many brand advertisement 
costs that produce long-term benefits; some brand advertisement 
costs, however, remain subject to capitalization. Surprisingly, the 
government has given little attention to the federal tax treatment 
of brand enforcement expenditures, leaving us a handful of pre­
INDOPCO judicial opm1ons that have created seemingly 
incoherent tax distinctions for such costs. 
B. TAX LAW ON BRAND ADVERTISEMENT 
Companies today devote significant financial resources to 
advertise their brands. They utilize billboards along the highways 
to reach motorists. They hire experts to create commercials for 
broadcasting on television or airing via radio stations. They 
purchase keywords from Google to ensure that searchers can reach 
their websites with ease. They create multimedia programs and 
apps to attract the attention of users to their brands. They rely on 
traditional print media like newspapers and magazines to reach 
particular segments of potential customers. They roll out major 
advertisement campaigns to rejuvenate or remake their brands. 
Overall, they employ all available tactics and means to advertise 
their brands. 
The tax treatment of costs associated with brand advertising 
has developed over the years. Shortly after the Supreme Court's 
INDOPCO decision, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued an 
important administrative ruling impacting brand advertising 
costs. In Revenue Ruling 92-80, the IRS ruled that INDOPCO 
"would not affect the treatment of advertising costs as business 
expenses which are generally deductible under section 162 of the 
Code."150 The IRS carved out an important exception: "Only in the 
H 9 See generally Jezabel Llorente, Nothing Left of INDOPCO: Let's Keep It That Way, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 277 (2001). 
iro Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, at *1 (1992). Current expensing of ordinary 
advertising has been administratively sanctioned since the 1960s. See Treas. Reg. § l.162­
20(a)(2) (allowing for expensing of expenditures for institutional or "good will" advertising); 
Denise Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 528, 552-53 (1957), affd and rev'd on other grounds, 
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unusual circumstance where advertising is directed towards 
obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally 
associated with ordinary [product, institutional,] or goodwill 
advertising, must the costs ... be capitalized." 151 
Branding is the process of "creating a unique name and image 
for a product in the consumers' mind, mainly through advertising 
campaigns with a consistent theme."152 Advertising campaign 
expenditures often create intellectual property rights in 
trademarks and trade dress (the total image and overall 
appearance of a product), 153 as such rights are based on use in 
commerce; 154 campaign expenditures often encompass the costs of 
creating copyrightable advertising materials as well. 155 An 
interesting question is whether these long-term intellectual 
property benefits should serve as the basis for reqmrrng 
capitalization of advertising campaign expenditures. In other 
words, do advertising campaigns aim to obtain future benefits 
beyond those traditionally associated with ordinary product, 
institutional, or goodwill advertising, which would require costs 
associated therewith to be capitalized under IRS guidelines? 
The United States Tax Court addressed that question in a trade 
dress and copyright development case decided six years after the 
271 F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1959) (holding that a political pamphlet advertisement was an 
ordinary and necessary business expense). 
15 1 Rev. Rul. 92-80, at *1 (emphasis added). The only example provided by the IRS was a 
case involving an electric company's advertisement to allay public fears about nuclear 
power. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 233 (1985) 
(holding that advertising expenditures related to construction of nuclear plant were not 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses). 
152 Branding, Bus. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/branding. 
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (emphasis added). 
153 See Trade Dress, INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.orgfl'rademark 
Basics/FactSheets/Pagesffrade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall commercial image 
(look and feel) of a product that indicates or identifies the source of the product and 
distinguishes it from those ofothers."). 
15~ See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK: ENHANCING 
YOUR RIGHTS THROUGH FEDERAL REGISTRATION 6 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default 
t/files/trademarks/basics/BasicFacts.pdf (listing use in commerce as one possible basis for a 
grant of intellectual property rights in trademarks). 
155 See, e.g., Advertising Spending in the United States from 2011 to 2017, by Medium (in 
Billion U.S. Dollars), STATlSTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/272315/advertising-spend 
ing-in-the-US-by-medium/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) (breaking down media spending on 
copyrightable advertisements throughout the years). 
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Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO and the IRS's issuance of 
Revenue Ruling 92-80. 156 In that case, the taxpayer incurred 
substantial costs in developing an advertising campaign-namely 
expenses related to the creation of graphic designs157 and package 
designs158 for the packaging of its cigarette products-and sought 
to deduct such campaign expenditures.159 The taxpayer also 
sought to deduct the costs of executing the campaign. 160 Although 
the government conceded that the advertising execution 
expenditures were deductible, it argued that the advertising 
campaign expenditures should be capitalized. 161 The government's 
argument was that the campaign expenditures provided long-term 
benefits that were not traditionally associated with ordinary 
business advertising. 162 The graphic design and package design 
costs provided legal rights and economic interests of a long-term 
nature-the legal rights being the statutory rights and common­
law trademark rights that attach to "trade dress," and the 
economic interests being the associated brand equity. 163 In 
addition, the taxpayer received long-term copyright protection for 
100 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998). The United States Tax 
Court is one of three courts that has original jurisdiction over tax cases. Courts of Original 
Jurisdiction, CCH GROUP, https://www.cchgroup.com/media/wkltaa/pdfs/accounting·firms/ 
taxlunderstanding-judicial-systems-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). It is the only 
forum in which a taxpayer may litigate a disputed tax claim without first having to pay the 
asserted deficiency. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2012). While the Tax Court is based in Washington, 
D.C., the court hears cases in several locations throughout the United States. See Places of 
Trial, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/dpt_cities.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2016) 
(listing the various places in which the court hears cases and listing its mailing address as 
being in Washington D.C.). 
rn7 "A 'graphic design' ... is a combination of verbal information, styles of print, pictures 
or drawings, shapes, patterns, colors, spacing, and the like that make up an overall visual 
display." RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. at 73. These designs "are developed for the following 
components of a cigarette product:" cartons, packages, flags, tipping, foils, cigarette papers, 
and closure seals. Id. at 74. They serve "to identify the product, convey information, and 
attract attention at the point of sale when the retailer displays the pack." Id. 
158 "The term 'package design' ... refers to the design of the physical construction of a 
package." Id. at 73. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 80. Advertising execution expenditures were defined by the IRS as costs of 
executing the advertising campaign (e.g., costs ofproduction of television commercials). Id. 
151 Id. 
162 Id. 
1s.1 Id. at 83. 
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its copyrightable advertising materials. 164 The court rejected the 
government's argument and held that graphic and package design 
costs incurred by the taxpayer were not required to be capitalized 
but were deductible as ordinary product advertising. 165 
The government's immediate response to the Tax Court's 
treatment of advertising campaign expenditures was unsurprising. 
In an Action on Decision, the IRS did not acquiesce to the court's 
decision and announced that it would continue to litigate the 
treatment of package design costs where appropriate. 166 According 
to the IRS, "Rev. Rul. 92-80 should not be read as a concession that 
package design costs are advertising and, therefore, deductible."167 
Citing an earlier ruling, the IRS concluded that "package design 
1s1 Id. at 84. 
165 Id. at 84-85. The court found that although the creation of graphic and package 
designs may contribute to the future patronage or goodwill of the taxpayer's business, 
Revenue Ruling 92-80 indicates that the costs are normally deductil>le. Id. at 82. 
Essentially, the court concluded that l>oth advertising campaign and advertising execution 
expenditures account for at least some of the value of the typical trade dress, and since 
advertising execution expenses are ordinary business expenses, "the long-term benefit 
associated with trade dress is a benefit traditionally associated with ordinary business 
advertising." Id. at 84. Therefore, the court held that all graphic design and package 
design costs incurred by the taxpayer were not required to be capitalized but were 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162. Id. at 84-85. 
As for the government's argument that copyright protection afforded to copyrightable 
advertising materials should serve as the basis for requiring the capitalization of 
advertising expenses, the court disagreed, concluding that the copyright protection, 
although long-term and for future business operation, was a traditional benefit associated 
with ordinary business advertising. Id. at 84. 
166 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998), action on dee., 1999-012, at 
*2 (Oct. 4, 1999) ("We disagree with the opinion and do not acquiesce. We will continue to 
litigate the treatment of package design costs where appropriate."). When the IRS loses a 
Tax Court case, the IRS will usually either acquiesce or nonacquiesce in the decision. A 
notice of acquiescence indicates that the IRS accepts the decision of the court, whereas a 
notice of nonacquiescence indicates that the IRS may continue to challenge other taxpayers 
with respect to the issue(s) presented in the case. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 71 (1998), nonacq. 1999-2- C.B. XVI, at *l. 
167 RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. 71, action on dee., 1998-012, at *l. For the IRS's position, see 
Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (§ 3.01) (deeming package design costs to be capital 
expenditures under § 3, as opposed to mere advertising costs); Rev. Proc. 98-39, 1998-26 
I.RB. 36 (§ 2.03(2)) (noting that a package design may have an "ascertainal>le useful life 
that extends substantially beyond the end of the tax year in which the costs are incurred"); 
Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448 (§ 3.04) (implying that package design costs are deductible 
only in certain limited circumstances); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85 (holding that 
package design costs are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses and 
must be capitalized under§ 263). 
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costs are capital expenditures ... hav[ing] an indeterminate useful 
life," and are therefore distinguishable from advertising costs. 168 
Five years later, however, in a major shift in tax policy, the 
government reversed its position in a new set of regulations. In 
January 2004, the Treasury issued final regulations that provide 
comprehensive rules for capitalization of amounts paid to create or 
acquire intangible assets. 169 Interestingly, the regulations 
effectively repeal the "significant future benefit" standard of 
INDOPCO and revive the "separate-and-distinct asset" test of 
Lincoln Savings discussed above.170 The reason given for using a 
separate-and-distinct asset standard was that "[a] 'significant 
future benefit' standard . . . does not provide the certainty and 
clarity necessary for compliance with, and sound administration 
of, the law."171 The regulations identify categories of intangibles 
for which capitalization is required, including "separate and 
distinct intangible assets" created by the taxpayer. 172 However, 
168 RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. 71, action on dee. 1998-012, at *l (citing Davee v. United 
States, 444 F.2d 557 (Ct. CI. 1971); Ala. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 
635, at *30-31 (1969); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 223 
(1985)). 
169 See Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4 (providing "rules for applying section 263(a) to amounts 
paid to acquire or create intangibles"). 
170 See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text. 
171 Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 
77, 701, 77,702 (Dec. 19, 2002} (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
172 Treas. Reg. §§ l.263(a)-4(b)(l)(iHiv). If an expenditure is not required to be 
capitalized by the final regulations (or by another provision of the Code), the IRS will not 
argue for capitalization on the ground that deduction of the expenditure does not clearly 
reflect income. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 436, 437 (Jan. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R pt. 1) (describing how the final 
regulations interact with the "clear reflection of income" requirement of section 446(b)). 
The regulations also require capitalization of amounts paid to "facilitate the ... creation of 
an intangible ... if the amount[s are] paid in the process of investigating or otherwise 
pursuing the transaction." Treas. Reg. §§ l.263(a)-4(b)(l)(vH(e)(l)(i) (emphasis added). 
But a taxpayer can elect to capitalize employee compensation, overhead, or de minimis 
costs. Id. § l.263(a)-4(e)(4)(iv). A taxpayer might capitalize such costs for financial 
accounting purposes and prefer not to segregate such costs for federal income tax purposes. 
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 Fed. Reg. at 440. 
The capitalization regulations adopt an exception termed the "12-month rule" 
applicable to most self-created intangibles. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4(f)(l). Under the twelve­
month rule, a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts that provide benefits of a 
relatively brief duration. Id. Specifically, the regulations provide: 
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the regulations then limit application of the standard, specifically 
providing that an amount paid to create a package design is n()t 
treated as an amount that creates a separate and distinct 
intangible asset. 173 Thus, under the final regulations, the costs of 
creating a package design are deductible. 
It should be noted that although a taxpayer can now expense 
the costs of developing a package design, the taxpayer must 
capitalize the costs of obtaining trademarks and copyrights on 
elements of the package design (i.e., the fees paid to a government 
agency to obtain trademark and copyright protection on certain 
elements of the package design). 174 For example, assume that a 
taxpayer who manufactures and markets personal care products 
pays a consultant $100,000 to develop a package design for the 
company's newest product, Product A. Assume also that the 
taxpayer pays a fee to a government agency to obtain trademark 
and copyright protection on certain elements of the package design 
and pays its outside legal counsel $10,000 for services rendered in 
preparing the filing, prosecuting trademark and copyright 
applications, and for other services rendered in securing the 
trademark and copyright protection. The taxpayer is not required 
to capitalize the $100,000 payment because amounts paid to 
develop a package design are treated as amounts that do not 
create a separate and distinct intangible asset. However, the 
taxpayer must capitalize the amounts paid to the government 
agency to obtain trademark and copyright protection. In addition, 
A taxpayer is not required to capitalize ... amounts paid to create ... any 
right or benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond the earlier 
of­
(1) 	12 months after the first date on which taxpayer realizes the right 
or benefit; or 
(2) The end of the taxable year following the taxable year in which the 
payment is made. 
Id. 
1w Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v) (describing the term package design as "the specific 
graphic arrangement or design of shapes, colors, words, pictures, lettering, and other 
elements on a given product, package, or the design of a container with respect to its shape 
or function"). 
m Id. § l.263(a)-4(d)(5). This result (capitalization of costs of obtaining federal trademark 
registrations) was the result under early case law. See, e.g., Deusenberg, Inc. DeL v. 
Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 922, 924-26 (1934) (finding that the fees to register a trademark were a 
capital expenditure), affd on other grounds, 84 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1936). 
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the $10,000 paid by the taxpayer to its outside counsel is an 
amount paid to facilitate the creation of the trademark and 
copyright and must therefore be capitalized as well. 175 
Likewise, a taxpayer must capitalize the cost of tangible assets 
associated with advertising. In Revenue Ruling 92-80 (the post­
INDOPCO ruling that confirmed the deductibility of ordinary 
product advertising), the IRS ruled that "expenditures for 
billboards, signs, and other tangible assets associated with 
advertising remain subject to the usual rules with respect to 
capitalization."176 
In short, although capitalization is the norm in tax theory, 
expensing is the reality when it comes to brand advertising 
investments, 177 with the exception of trademark and copyright 
registration fees and tangible assets associated with advertising. 
This approach adopted by the government is critiqued later in this 
Article. 178 
C. TAX LAW ON BRAND ENFORCEMENT 
As part of brand enforcement, taxpayers resort to litigation 
against infringing activities, e.g., the unauthorized use of the 
taxpayer's trademark. 179 In trademark litigation, the owner 
115 Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4(l), Example 9. 
176 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998), action on dee., 1999-012 
(Oct. 4, 1999). Final Treasury Regulations issued in 2013 dealing with capitalization of 
tangible assets confirm this result. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2(d)(l) (requiring capitalization of 
amounts paid to produce or acquire a unit of real or personal property other than materials 
and supplies). For an early case, see Best Lock Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1217, 1238 (1959) 
("[A]mounts paid ... to produce [a sale catalog) were capital items contributing to earning 
income for several years in the future and not ordinary and necessary expenses of doing 
business ...."). 
177 Deductible advertising must meet requirements applicable to all business expenses. 
See supra note 114 (noting the Code's allowance of deductions for "ordinary and necessary" 
business expenses). Thus, deductible advertising must relate to an existing trade or 
business (or expansion) and must be reasonable in amount, especially in relation to the 
amount of the benefit expended. See, e.g., Menard, Inc. v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 229, 
247 (2004) ("[T)o the extent the expenditures are reasonable in amount, the taxpayer may 
deduct them as ordinary and necessary business expenses attributable to advertising."), 
rev'd on other grounds, 560 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2009); Schlafer v. Comm'r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1374 (1990) (holding claimed deductions for sponsoring a race car were not reasonable). 
11a See infra Part VI. 
119 See, e.g., U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.D. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1188 (6th Cir. 
1997) (arguing that defendant's use of the Archadeck trademark was unauthorized). 
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desires to enJom the illegal conduct and seeks compensatory 
damages, defendant's profits, and in some instances, enhanced 
damages and attorney's fees. 180 In such litigation, the owner often 
faces affirmative defenses, such as assertions that the trademark 
at issue is invalid because it has become generic, is descriptive 
without secondary meaning established, or has been abandoned 
through naked licensing or extensive unauthorized use. 181 
Consequently, the owner will incur litigation costs, including the 
costs to overcome those affirmative defenses threatening to cancel 
or invalidate the property rights held by the owner. 
There are no intellectual property-specific Code provisions 
pertaining directly to brand enforcement legal costs. Thus, we 
apply general tax principles discussed above: ordinary and 
necessary business and investment expenses are currently 
deductible while capital expenditures are not. The "norm" is 
capitalization. 182 With respect to litigation costs, courts generally 
considered whether the taxpayer's primary purpose in initiating or 
defending the litigation should be controlling, or whether the 
outcome of the litigation should be a factor. It is now well settled 
that the origin and character of the claim with respect to which 
the costs of litigation are incurred is the controlling test. 183 
Generally, to be currently deductible, litigation costs cannot 
originate in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset. 184 This 
180 See id. at 1188 ("U.S. Structures prayed for an accounting, delivery of phone numbers 
and other materials associated with the Archadeck name, damages, treble damages, 
injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs."). 
181 See, e.g., Barnes Grp. Inc. v. Connell Ltd. P'ship, 793 F. Supp. 1277, 1297, 1305 (D. Del. 
1992) (arguing that the trademark became generic, a common descriptive feature, and had 
been abandoned). 
182 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) ("The notion that deductions are 
exceptions to the norm of capitalization finds support in various aspects of the Code."). 
1&1 See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963) (holding that "the origin and 
character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred ... is the controlling 
basic test of ... whether [the expense] is deductible"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 108360-10 (July 
29, 2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1045005.pdf ("The controlling test to distinguish 
business expenses from personal or capital expenditures is the 'origin of claim' test." (citing 
Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429, 433 (7th Cir. 1970)). 
1s4 See Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 575-76 (1970) ("[C)osts incurred in the 
acquisition of a capital asset are to be treated as capital expenditures."); United States v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 583 (1970) ("[T]he expenses of litigation that arise out of 
the acquisition of a capital asset are capital expenses."); Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49-50 ("[I)t 
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is also known as the "origin-of-the-claim" test, a factually specific 
inquiry wherein consideration must be given to "the issues 
involved, the nature and objectives of the suit in which the 
expenditures were made, the defenses asserted, the purpose for 
which the claimed deductions were expended, the background of 
the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the entire controversy." 185 
The corollary to the origin-of-the-claim principle is that the cost of 
defending or perfecting title to property is inherently a capital 
expenditure. 186 Thus, the tax treatment of litigation costs varies 
depending on the nature of the litigation. To be immediately 
deductible, litigation must not relate to title of property, but rather 
to income from it. When litigation is conducted both to defend or 
was manifestly Congress' purpose with respect to deductibility to place all income­
producing activities on an equal footing."). 
185 Estate of Morgan v. Comm'r, 332 F.2d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1964), acq., 1966-2 C.B. 3. 
The "origin-of-the-claim" test was originally created by the Supreme Court in United States 
v. Gilmore and was used to determine whether litigation costs were incurred in a business 
or profit-seeking context or whether the costs were personal. 372 U.S. 49. In Gilmore, the 
taxpayer attempted to deduct a portion of the legal fees he paid in a divorce proceeding­
specifically, that portion attributable to his attorney's efforts to protect his ownership of 
certain closely held stock (income-producing property) that his spouse had demanded in the 
divorce. Id. at 41-42. The Court held that the divorce proceeding and the costs thereof 
"stemmed entirely from the marital relationship" and were thus nondeductible personal 
expenses. Id. at 51-52. 
The origin-of-the-claim standard has also been used to determine whether litigation 
costs-even if incurred in a business or profit-seeking activity-are nondeductible capital 
expenditures. In Woodward v. Commissioner, taxpayers who owned a majority interest in a 
corporation paid legal fees in an appraisal proceeding that arose in connection with the 
required purchase of a dissenting minority shareholder's stock. 397 U.S. 572, 573-74 
(1970). Relying on its decision in Gilmore, the Supreme Court held that the origin of the 
claim that gave rise to the legal fees was the acquisition of stock and that the fees should 
therefore be capitalized. Id. at 578-79. 
186 Treas. Reg.§§ 1.263(a)-4(d)(9)-4(e)(5), Example 6 (requiring capitalization of litigation 
expenses incurred in defense of title to intangible property); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 
199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *3 (June 25, 1999) (citing former Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2); 
Ca. & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235, 242 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ("[T)he 
Code and the regulations require that, before the expenditures can be deductible, they must 
be ... other than permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of 
any property or estate, including expenditures incurred in defending or perfecting title to 
property." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). The costs incurred in defending or 
perfecting title to property are considered to be part of the cost of the property, and they 
must be capitalized. Ca. & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp., 311 F.2d at 241-42. This rule is 
functionally equivalent to the general rule requiring acquisition costs to be capitalized. 
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perfect title (capital) and to preserve or collect income (deductible), 
an allocation between the two categories is appropriate. 187 
Judicial precedents pertaining to the tax treatment of brand 
enforcement legal costs are extremely limited. The well-settled 
case relates to the tax treatment of legal costs of defending 
trademark registrations in cancellation proceedings. In Georator 
Corp. v. United States, 188 the taxpayer incurred litigation expenses 
in defending its trademark registration in a cancellation 
proceeding. 189 The ground for cancellation was that the taxpayer's 
trademark had become the common name for certain types of 
products; the cancellation proceeding was later dismissed because 
of failure to present substantial evidence to refute the validity 
presumption afforded the trademark at issue by virtue of its 
registration. 190 The Fourth Circuit first observed that federal 
registration of a trademark confers several benefits upon the 
holder of a trademark. The benefits, which are of long-term 
duration, include: (1) constructive notice of ownership in the 
trademark; (2) prima facie evidence of trademark validity, 
registrant's ownership, and exclusive right to use the trademark in 
commerce; (3) the possibility that the registration will become 
incontestable after five years of continuous use and constitute 
conclusive evidence of the registrant's right to use the trademark; 
(4) the registrant's right to request customs officials to bar the 
importation of goods bearing marks similar to the registered 
trademark; and (5) registration effective for the initial period of 
twenty years and possible subsequent renewal. 191 Because the 
benefits of federal registration are of indeterminate duration, the 
costs of obtaining trademark registration must be capitalized. 192 
Because the costs of obtaining federal trademark registrations are 
capital expenditures, the costs of litigation defending the federal 
187 Treas. Reg. § 1.212-l(k) ("Attorneys' fees paid in a suit to quiet title to lands are not 
deductible; but if the suit is also to collect accrued rents thereon, that portion of such fees is 
deductible which is properly allocable to the services rendered in collecting such rents."). 
188 485 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1973). 
189 Id. at 284. 
ioo Id. 
191 Id. at 285. 
192 This is the result on current regulations discussed above. See supra notes 174-76 and 
accompanying text. 
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trademark registrations from cancellations are also capital 
expenditures. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Georator noted that 
"successful opposition to a cancellation proceeding secures the 
benefits of registration as much as does the original registration of 
the trademark."193 
The less-settled case relates to the tax treatment of legal costs 
incurred in trademark infringement actions. In trademark 
infringement actions, trademark owners often seek damages as 
well as an injunction restraining the defendant from using a 
confusing mark. 194 Consequently, the question arises whether the 
litigation relates to the recovery of lost income from the trademark 
(in which cases costs are deductible) or to perfecting or preserving 
rights to the trademark (in which case costs must be capitalized as 
in Georator). In patent infringement cases, courts have held that 
litigation costs are currently deductible. 195 The reason is that 
patent infringement litigation is viewed as a "far cry from 
removing a cloud of title, or defending ownership of property." 196 
Rather, patent infringement cases are aimed at recovering a 
taxpayer's lost profits. 197 Thus, legal costs in a patent 
infringement action-for the purpose of protecting royalties 
previously derived as well as those to be derived in the future-are 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses regardless 
of whether the taxpayer is successful or unsuccessful in the 
19a 485 F.2d at 285. 
194 See, e.g., Urquhart v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954) (seeking an injunction and 
damages in trademark action). 
195 See id. (finding litigation costs to be ordinary and necessary expenses). 
196 Id. at 20. In patent infringement actions, the defense of invalidity of patent claims is 
normally raised and disposed of first. But courts have held that litigation costs are 
nevertheless deductible when the original claim was commonplace patent infringement. Id. 
at 19. 
rn1 Id. at 20 ("In patent nomenclature what the infringer makes is 'profits,' what the 
owner of the patent loses by such infringement is 'damages.' And usually, although not 
always, what a patent owner loses from infringement is the acquisition of 'a just and 
deserved gain' from the exploitation of the invention embodied in his patent. Therefore an 
award of damages in patent litigation is ordinarily an award of compensation for gains or 
profits lost by the patent owner and hence is taxable to him as income in the year received." 
(citations omitted) (quoting Mathey v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 259, 262 (1st Cir. 1949)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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infringement action. 198 It appears legal costs in copyright 
infringement actions receive the same tax treatment as legal costs 
in patent infringement actions. l99 
In contrast to patent and copyright infringement cases, 
trademark infringement cases "are of peculiar pedigree."200 In two 
cases, the Second Circuit and Tenth Circuit adopted similar 
reasoning in requiring capitalization of attorney's fees and other 
litigation costs in trademark infringement suits. In Danskin, Inc. 
v. Commissioner, 201 the Second Circuit analyzed the purpose and 
effect of the legal expenses in the underlying trademark 
infringement case. 202 Although the complaint for infringement 
included a plea for damages, the Second Circuit observed that the 
legal expenses increased the value of the taxpayer's trademark, 
secured the property right of the taxpayer in the trademark, and 
eliminated future infringement by the use of a similar 
l98 Id. at 20--21; see also I.RS. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,490, 1980 WL 131296 (Aug. 27, 1980) 
(stating that legal expenses associated with preventing patent infringement incurred by an 
inventor who is in the business of inventing and licensing patents are deductible as 
ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162). 
100 See Saltzman v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1544, 1569 (1994) (holding that a portion of 
the litigation costs in a copyright infringement action were to recover lost income and hence 
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses); I.RS. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 
199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *2 (June 25, 1999) (noting an apt comparison exists 
between patents and copyrights in addressing "[w]hether costs incurred in the pursuit and 
settlement of a copyright infringement action instituted by the Taxpayer may be deducted 
as ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses or, instead, must be capitalized"). 
200 I.RS. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 199925012, at *3 (summarizing tax cases involving 
trademark infringement costs). 
201 331 F.2d 360, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), affg, 40 T.C. 318 (1963). For further discussion of the 
deductibility of legal expenses in the context of intellectual property litigation, see I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 8831001 (Apr. 8, 1988); Tech. Adv. Mem. 8022002 (1980). 
202 In Danskin, the taxpayer owned the federally registered DANSKIN trademark and 
used the trademark in connection with manufacturing and marketing ladies' and children's 
leotards, tights, and related items. Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 318, 319 (1963), aff'd, 
331 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1964). In the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, the taxpayer asserted a trademark infringement action against a competitor 
for using the GAMSKIN trademark. Id. at 319-20. The court granted the taxpayer's 
request for a temporary restraining order, and the parties later settled the litigation. Id. at 
320. The defendant agreed to stop using the GAMSKIN trademark and to pay all court 
costs and damages in the amount of $7,000 if it ever breached any provision of the 
settlement. Id. The taxpayer incurred $4,666 in connection with the litigation and 
subsequent settlement. Id. The taxpayer sought to deduct the costs as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses under section 162 of the Code. Id. The IRS disallowed the 
claimed deductions, and the Tax Court sustained the IRS's determination. Id. at 319-22. 
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trademark.203 Thus, the taxpayer enjoyed a financial gain that 
would endure "for many years to come; and therefore the pattern 
of the revenue laws of accurately matching income and expenses 
within annual accounting periods requires that these legal 
expenses be classified as capital outlays."204 According to the 
court, the costs of removing the infringing threat to a trademark 
resemble the costs of perfecting or preserving title to property.205 
Such costs are well established as capital expenditures, not 
currently deductible business expenses.206 The Tenth Circuit, in 
Medco Products Co. v. Commissioner, 207 later relied in part upon 
Danskin in holding that litigation costs incurred in a trademark 
infringement action were not deductible expenses.208 
In at least one case, however, the Tax Court allowed the 
deduction of legal costs incurred by a taxpayer who had a 
trademark registration and unsuccessfully alleged trademark 
infringement against a defendant. In J.R. Wood & Sons, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 209 the IRS disallowed the taxpayer's claimed 
deductions, arguing that the litigation was to defend or perfect 
title to the taxpayer's trademark, as supported by the mere fact 
that in the trademark litigation the defendant raised a defense of 
trademark abandonment. 210 The Tax Court rejected the IRS's 
argument as without support because the court in the trademark 
infringement suit did not address the abandonment issue.211 The 
Tax Court found that the taxpayer "did not seek to gain, protect or 
improve title to any capital asset and, although the litigation was 
unsuccessful, [the taxpayer] lost nothing of a capital nature in that 
203 331 F.2d at 361. 
:ro1 Id. 
205 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 523 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1975), afI'g 62 T.C. 509 (197 4). 
2os Id. at 139. For an earlier case than Danskin or Medco, see Food Fair of Va., Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1089, 1089 (1950) (holding that litigation expenses incurred by the 
taxpayer, who used the trade name "Food Fair" in connection with its retail grocery 
business, in a suit against a competitor for using the same name were not deductible 
because the suit was to defend the taxpayer's title or right in the trade name). 
20'J 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038 (Aug. 7, 1962). 
210 Id. at *2. 
211 Id. 
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litigation."212 Accordingly, the litigation costs were incurred in the 
ordinary conduct of the taxpayer's business in an effort to protect 
its income and were thus allowable for deduction.213 
J.R. Wood is perhaps an isolated aberration of the Tax Court. 
Indeed, the case was expressly questioned and rejected by the IRS 
years later after the Danskin and Medco decisions.214 The purpose 
of a trademark infringement action, even if it is unsuccessful, is to 
secure benefits in the trademark, such as the exclusive right to use 
the trademark in commerce.215 Such benefits have a life beyond 
the taxable year, as noted by the Second Circuit in Danskin and 
the Tenth Circuit in Medco. 216 Since there was no infringement of 
the taxpayer's trademark in J.R. Wood, the taxpayer continued to 
benefit from all the exclusive rights in the trademark. 
In trademark litigation, the trademark owner often asserts both 
trademark infringement and unfair competition claims.217 The 
unfair competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is 
a very broad claim that encompasses a defendant's use of a 
trademark or trade dress in commerce that causes a likelihood of 
consumer confusion as to the source of the defendant's trademark 
or trade dress and the plaintiffs trademark or trade dress.218 Both 
unfair competition claims and trademark infringement claims 
reach the same likelihood-of-consumer confusion test; most courts 
analyze the test and reach the same conclusion to both claims.219 
As such, monetary damages are available for both claims under 
the Lanham Act. The question then becomes whether these claims 
should be treated the same for tax purposes. 
At least one case did not treat trademark and unfair 
competition claims similarly for tax purposes and ruled that 
litigation costs incurred in connection with an unfair competition 
212 Id. 
21a Id. 
214 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38490, 1980 WL 131296, at *2 n.1 (Aug. 27, 1980); see also 
I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 199925012, 1999 WL 424839, at *3 n.1 (June 25, 1999) ("Wood was 
expressly questioned in [Gen. Couns. Mem.) 38490, and its result was rejected."). 
2rn See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
21s Medco Products Co. v. Comm'r, 523 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir. 1975); Danskin, Inc. v. 
Comm'r, 40 T.C. 318, 323 (1963). 
211 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
21s 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
2rn See supra note 7 4 and accompanying text. 
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claim were currently deductible. In Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United 
States, the taxpayer-plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant 
in federal court for trademark infringement and unfair 
competition.220 The defendant then filed an opposition proceeding 
in the Patent and Trademark Office against the taxpayer­
plaintiffs trademark registration.221 In the early stages of 
litigation, the taxpayer-plaintiff commissioned a trademark 
recognition survey for purposes of using the survey to demonstrate 
that its trademark was valid.222 The taxpayer-plaintiff did not 
have an opportunity to use the survey, because the litigation was 
settled and the opposition proceeding was terminated.223 But the 
taxpayer-plaintiff later used the trademark recognition survey for 
its advertising purposes.224 
The taxpayer sought to deduct its legal costs, as well as the 
costs of the trademark recognition survey.225 Strangely, the court 
divided the litigation expenses equally between the unfair 
competition and trademark infringement claims.226 The court 
observed that the trademark infringement claim sought judicial 
determination that the plaintiff had a property right in the 
trademark, while the unfair competition claim sought money 
damages for the alleged unfair competition.227 Accordingly, 
litigation expenses associated with the trademark infringement 
claim were not deductible because they were incurred for the 
purpose of protecting or perfecting title in property.228 Expenses 
associated with the unfair competition claim, however, were 
deductible.229 
In addition, the court divided the survey costs "equally between 
those properly deductible and those not so deductible."230 The 
court found that the consumer recognition survey was conducted 
220 280 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 

221 Id. at 798. 

222 Id. 

223 Id. 
224 Id. 

225 Id. at 796. 

22s Id. at 801. 

221 Id. 

22a Id. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
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for contemplated use of supporting both the trademark 
infringement and unfair competition claims.231 Accordingly, half of 
the survey costs would be deductible, as such costs contributed to 
the unfair competition claim.232 The other halfwould be treated as 
capital expenditures and not deductible in the year incurred.233 
The taxpayer unsuccessfully attempted to have the total costs of 
the consumer recognition survey deducted as costs for advertising 
purposes.234 Though the taxpayer-plaintiff indeed used the survey 
results for advertising purposes, such use was subsequent to the 
settlement of the litigation, which occurred at an early stage.235 
The court thus determined that such use could "hardly be given 
retroactive significance as the primary purpose for which [the 
surveys] were secured."236 
VI. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES AND PROPOSALS 
A business must both use a trademark in commerce and defend 
it if necessary, or risk losing it under intellectual property laws.237 
As described in Part V, the federal income tax treatment of use 
(advertising costs) and enforcement (litigation costs) varies 
greatly. Advertising dollars spent to build up the goodwill value of 
a trademark are expensed (with the exception of the costs of 
tangible assets associated with advertising).238 In contrast, 
litigation costs incurred to protect that enhancement of value must 
be capitalized (with the exception of legal costs in unfair 
competition claims). 239 These tax distinctions for branding 
2~1 Id. at 797, 801. 
:1.12 Id. at 801. 
:1.13 Id. at 801-02. 
2:M Id. Recall from above that ordinary product and institutional goodwill advertising costs 
are deductible under section 162. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
2:1s Id. at 796-97. 
236 Id. at 801. 
2a1 See Loss of Trademark Rights, INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N (May 2015), http:l/www.inta. 
orgffrademarkBasics/FactSheets!Pages/Lossofl'rademarkRightsFactSheet.aspx ("The most 
common way to lose rights in a mark is to stop using the mark with no intention to use it 
again .... Trademark rights may also be lost when ... the owner does little or nothing to 
police its mark, [as] the mark is likely to lose some or all of its value as a source identifier in 
the marketplace."). 
2.'l8 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
2.19 See supra Part V.c. 
450 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:399 
activities raise important policy questions. If these tax 
distinctions lack theoretical justification, legislative or 
administrative changes may be warranted. 
A. IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE FRAMEWORK FOR BRAND 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES 
Regarding the deductibility of business and investment 
expenses, the "norm" is capitalization and therefore 
depreciation/amortization.240 As described in Part V, however, 
wide exemptions from normative capitalization have been 
established for brand development expenditures. Under current 
law, costs of usual brand advertising are currently deductible.241 
This includes, for example, the costs of using social media, 
maintaining a website, purchasing keywords, embedding keywords 
in a website, placing an ad in the newspaper, bundling inserts of 
ad pages with newspapers, distributing flyers, and sending logos 
in e-mails. In addition, the costs of unusual brand advertising are 
currently deductible.242 This includes, for example, advertising 
campaign costs and graphic and package design costs.243 The 
favorable treatment of advertising suggests that the government 
views advertising expenses as part of a "normal" income tax 
system; indeed, "neither the Joint Committee on Taxation nor the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) treats advertising 
deductions as a 'tax expenditure'" for the government.244 
In stark contrast to the current tax regime (expensing), 
arguments could be made for the uniform capitalization of all 
advertising costs.245 It could be argued, for instance, that 
advertising-campaigns and executions-should not be viewed as 
240 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). 
24 t See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
242 See supra notes 169-77. 
243 See supra notes 169--77. 
244 Annette Nellen, Advertising Expense and Tax Reform: How Not to Broaden the Tax 
Base, AICPA (July 31, 2014), http://www.cpa2biz.com/ContenUmedia/PRODUCER_CONTE 
NT/Newsletters/Articles_2014/CorpTax/BroadenTaxBase.jsp. 
245 See Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX 
REV. 347, 444 (2000) (questioning the tax deduction for advertising on the basis of public 
welfare concerns); Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229, 
2266-67 (2014) (arguing that tax law should require capitalization of investments in self· 
created intellectual capital, including branding). 
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part of a "normal" income tax system; rather, advertising is an 
unusual cost that invariably produces unique, long-term benefits, 
which, alone, justifies capitalization. Advertising campaign 
expenditures typically result in statutory and common law 
trademark rights that attach to trade dress, copyright protections, 
and economic interests associated with brand equity.246 These 
intangible benefits are not realized in the current year alone, but 
endure over the economic life of the brands. As with advertising 
campaign expenditures, advertising execution expenditures often 
provide benefits that endure for many years.247 For example, a 
communication to the general public for the purpose of promoting 
a business or its products-whether in the form of website display, 
multimedia program, video segments to go viral on YouTube, e­
mail communication, radio broadcast, or newspaper publication­
has the potential to yield benefits for the business that extend 
beyond the current year, as a memorable communication, 
transmitted only once, may have a lingering impact on a particular 
consumer. Case law has recognized the similar benefits produced 
by both campaign and execution expenditures to justify similar tax 
treatment, i.e., current deduction for both.248 But these similar 
benefits are of a long-term nature, justifying a different outcome, 
i.e., capitalization for both. 
The uniform capitalization of advertising costs would broaden 
the tax base and raise necessary revenue for the government in a 
climate of serious budget deficits. Legislative proposals have been 
made to restrict the tax deduction for advertising. Most recently, 
in 2014, Representative David Camp introduced legislation that 
would require large businesses to capitalize most advertising 
expenses and then amortize such expenses over ten years.249 A 
2<r. RJR Nabisco Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 82 (1998). 

m Id. at 84. 

2<B See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text. 

2<9 Tax Reform Act of 2014, H.R. 1, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 

bills/113/hrl. Camp's proposal, which would be phased-in until 2018, would add Section 
177 to the Code and allow an immediate tax deduction for advertising expenses in any 
taxable year that do not exceed $1 million. Id. § 3110(b) (providing that the exemption is 
phased out for otherwise deductible advertising expenses in any year exceeding $1.5 
million). Then, fifty percent of "specified advertising expenses" would be charged to a 
capital account and allowed an amortization deduction ratably over the ten-year period, 
beginning with the midpoint of the taxable year in which such expenses are paid or 
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similar bill was proposed in 2013 by Senator Max Baucus that 
would have required advertisers to deduct only fifty percent of all 
advertising expenses and amortize the remainder over the next 
five years.25° These proposals, which would raise revenue without 
raising income tax rates, have been criticized and do not appear to 
be gaining support.251 Critics contend that capitalization is 
unwarranted and "would deny businesses the ability to deduct 
their expenses and thus overstate their taxable income"; indeed, it 
was suggested that Camp's proposal "would increase business 
taxes by $169 billion over ten years."252 The advertising industry, 
particularly, the Association of National Advertising, has criticized 
any legislation, arguing that such action would have a profound 
impact on both the advertising industry and the economy more 
broadly by increasing the cost of advertising and causing a 
"substantial disincentive for companies to spend additional 
advertising dollars."253 According to the advertising industry, 
advertising drives sales and jobs, stimulates new economic 
activity, and in 2012, it accounted for $5.6 trillion of U.S. output 
and supported 21.1 million-nearly 16%-of the 136.2 million U.S. 
jobs.254 It was estimated that if Camp's proposal were 
incurred. Id. "Specified advertising expenses" include advertising expenses paid or 
incurred for the development, production, or placement ofany communication to the general 
public which is intended to promote the taxpayer or a trade or business; specified 
advertising expenses do not include discounts or coupons, creation of logos, trade names, 
package design, or market research. Id. § 31 l0(d)(2). 
250 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
FlNANCE CHAIRMAN'S STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT TO REFORM CERTAIN BUSINESS PROVISIONS 
46 (JCX-19-13) (Comm. Point 2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov (click search tool at top 
right corner; search "Final SFC Business TE 11-19-13"); see also Press Release, Sen. Comm. 
on Fin., Baucus Works to Overhaul Outdated Tax Code (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.finan 
ce.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/releasef?id=536eefeb-2ae2-453f-affi6-946c305d5c93. 
2:;1 See, e.g., Nellen, supra note 244 (critiquing Rep. Camp's proposal based on its 
complexity, predictability, accounting principles, economic efficiency, and competitiveness). 
But see Kahng, supra note 245, at 2275 ("[R]ecent legislative proposals of 50% seem 
reasonable in view of empirical estimates."). 
2s2 Curtis S. Dubay & David R. Burton, Chairman Camp's Tax Reform Plan Keeps Debate 
Alive Despite Flaws, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/re 
ports/2014/03/chairman-camps-tax-reform-plan-keeps-debate-alive-despite-flaws. 
253 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Potential Changes in Deductibility of 
Advertising Expenses Within Tax Reform Legislation Would Only Serve to Stifle Economic 
Activity (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/28593. 
254 Id. 
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implemented, "more than 1. 7 million jobs and $456 billion in sales 
would be jeopardized."255 The advertising industry, however, is 
not the only group to show the persuasive forces of advertising. 256 
In a recent non-industry sponsored study, the Centre for Economic 
Performance studied the effect of advertising expenditures of firms 
and consumer prices across industries and found that advertising 
tends to lower consumer prices across the board.257 
Criticism of legislative proposals to change the current 
advertising deduction illustrates the difficulty policymakers would 
have in moving toward a uniform capitalization rule for all 
advertising costs. As noted by Professor Johnson, a strong 
proponent of capitalization in general, 
[E]xpensing of various investments has crept into the 
income tax system over the years. . . . Part of it is a 
"tragedy of the commons" in politics, under which the 
special exemptions systematically triumph over the 
common good. The public cannot be organized to 
protect the general welfare because the interest of 
each member of the public in a fair and uniform tax 
255 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Advertising Deduction Wrongly Targeted in 
Chairman Camp's Proposed Tax Reform Legislation; Provision Would Stifle Economic 
Activity (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.ana.net/content/show/id/29628. 
256 See, e.g., Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Transformation of Trademark Law, 
38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) ("Courts also accepted that advertising played a positive role in 
the national economy."); Jerrold L. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State: II, 42 TEX. L. 
REV. 603, 614-16 (1964) ("Advertising expenditures in this country have constantly 
escalated over the last decade, and it is now confidently predicted that they will attain the 
phenomenal annual total of 25 billion dollars ten years hence. This fact is indicative of the 
indispensable role played by advertising in conjunction with mass communication media in 
the economy of the positive state."). 
257 Ferdinand Rauch, Advertising Expenditure and Consumer Prices, CTR. FOR ECON. 
PERFORMANCE (Aug. 2011), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1093.pdf; see also Brad 
Plumer, Does Advertising Help or Harm the Economy?, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2012), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/ 11127/does-advertising-help-or-harm-the 
-economy/ (discussing the Centre's findings). For a study conducted by Global Insight, Inc., 
an economics organization, see IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES 2012-2017, https://www.ana.net/getfile/ 
20391. 
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system is too low, and the interest of those seeking a 
special exemption is so intense.258 
But it has been argued that the current advertising deduction 
has never been a tax preference item, 'loophole' or 
special interest benefit. Rather, it provides an 
opportunity for every company in every industry 
throughout the U.S. to communicate efficiently with 
consumers about products and services.... [They] 
always have been ... treated no differently than any 
other ordinary and necessary business expense.259 
In sum, while uniform capitalization for all advertising would 
contribute to a sound tax base, it would increase the cost of 
advertising for firms and perhaps be too hard for businesses to 
accept and policymakers to defend. 
Although capitalization is the norm in our income tax system, 
in practice it is not. In numerous instances, the government has 
justified exemptions that deliberately drive economic 
decisionmaking. For example, to encourage research activity and 
to stimulate economic growth and technological development, 
Congress permits taxpayers to expense research and development 
expenditures that might otherwise have to be capitalized.260 As a 
258 Calvin H. Johnson, Omnibus Capitalization Proposals, 124 TAX NOTES 1121, 1122 
(2009). 
259 Press Release, Ass'n of Nat'! Advertisers, supra note 255. 
260 See l.R.C. § l 74(a) (2012) (allowing taxpayers to treat research and experimental 
expenditures as expenses not chargeable to capital account); id. § 263(a)(l)(B) (providing 
that the capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not apply to research and experimental 
expenditures deductible under section l 74(a)). For the statute's legislative history, see H.R. 
REP. No. 1337, at 4262-64 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4053; 100 CONG. 
REC. 3,425 (1954) (statement of Chairman Reed: "This provision will greatly stimulate the 
search for new products and new inventions upon which the future economic and military 
strength of our Nation depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing 
businesses."). See also Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures 
Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAX L. REV. 549, 549 (1955) (noting a primary reason for enacting 
section 174 was to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal 
subsidy of research and development start-ups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for 
Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349 (1987) 
(explaining that Congress decided to provide taxpayers with the option of an immediate 
deduction in order to encourage new research and development); Richard L. Parker, The 
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further example, to encourage investment in productive, 
depreciable, tangible personal property and to encourage economic 
activity, Congress allows taxpayers to immediately expense the 
acquisition cost of such property, subject to certain limitations.261 
The relevant inquiry here is whether the law's current exemptions 
for both usual advertising (ordinary product, institutional, or 
goodwill advertising) and unusual advertising (advertising 
campaigns) are sound. We argue below that, when evaluated 
under normative tax policy criteria, expensing makes sense for the 
former category, but capitalization should apply for the latter. 
1. Expensing Usual Advertising Expenditures. Tax law's 
current treatment (expensing) of ordinary brand advertising 
serves legitimate goals. Most notably, advertising stimulates 
economic growth and thus produces positive externalities. In a 
recent study analyzing the total economic impact of advertising 
expenditures across sixteen industries and the government, 
researchers determined that each dollar spent on advertising 
expenses generates nearly $22 of economic output that would not 
have otherwise existed.262 Additionally, every $1 million spent on 
annual advertising expenses supports eighty-one American jobs.263 
The study projected that "[b]y 2017, advertising will directly and 
indirectly foster $6.5 trillion in U.S. economic activity (sales) and 
help support 22.1 million U.S. jobs."264 Thus, while it is important 
to the economy to stimulate the search for new products and new 
inventions, it is equally important to support the dissemination of 
Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start­
Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 694 (1990) ("The deduction election under section l 74(a) 
is intended to encourage research and development activities by allowing the cost of such 
activities to be used to offset the income earned in the business at the earliest possible 
date."). 
261 See I.RC. § l 79(a) (allowing taxpayers to elect to write off the cost of acquisition of 
"section 179 property" as an expense "not chargeable to capital account"). Section 179 
property is tangible property or off-the-shelf computer software, which is personal property 
and is purchased for the active conduct of a trade or business. Id. § 179(d)(l). There are 
limits on the amount that can be expensed in any given year. Id. § l 79(b). 
262 Press Release, Ass'n ofNat'l Advertisers, New Study Underscores Advertising's Role as 
a Critical Driver of the U.S. Economy (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.ana.net/content/show/ 
id/29212. Economists and other research groups have also studied the persuasive effects of 
advertising. See Rauch, supra note 257; IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, INC., supra note 257. 
26:1 Press Release, Ass'n ofNat'l Advertisers, supra note 262. 

26~ Id. 
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those products through marketing.265 If policymakers wish not to 
subsidize the marketing of "bad" products (e.g., alcohol or tobacco 
products) out of social welfare concerns, then special capitalization 
rules could be carved out for advertising investments associated 
with those products.266 
Current expensmg of usual advertising costs furthers 
administrative efficiency.267 In contrast, a capitalization rule for 
such costs would necessarily add complexity to the current tax 
system. For example, a default capitalization rule for advertising 
would have to define "advertising" to avoid ambiguities and 
provide clarity of tax result, a seemingly impossible task. 268 
Advertising would surely include fees paid to an outside marketing 
firm. But would advertising include salaries paid to employees in 
a company's marketing or public relations department, which 
otherwise are expensed under current law? Would advertising 
include wages paid to in-house counsel or fees to outside counsel to 
265 But see Kahng, supra note 245, at 2266 ("[I]t is hard to justify a deduction for 
advertising to promote a brand on the grounds that it provides socially valuable spillover 
effects."). 
266 See Hymel, supra note 245, at 444-61 (noting such past legislative and scholarly 
proposals to amend the advertising tax deduction). 
267 Expensing is sometimes used by the government to eliminate uncertainties caused by 
the capitalization principle. Section 174, for example, allows taxpayers to elect to 
immediately deduct qualified research and development expenditures that would otherwise 
be capitalized. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. While the primary justification 
for the special deduction was to encourage new research and development activity and 
stimulate economic growth and technological development, as noted supra note 260, 
another justification was to reduce uncertainties caused by applying the asset capitalization 
rules to research and development activities. See David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of 
Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW. 85, 88-89 (1991) (discussing the problems 
associated with the capitalization rules); George Mundstock, Tamtion of Business 
Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1258-59 (1987) ("Besides reducing uncertainty, 
section 17 4 was intended to encourage R&D and to ensure that start-up businesses can 
deduct R&D that would be deductible by an ongoing concern."). 
268 The current capitalization rules for costs of improvements to tangible property has 
been plagued by similar problems. For instance, the costs of improvements (as opposed to 
repairs) to property must be capitalized. I.RC. § 263(a) (2012). But what is an 
improvement? Although the regulations under section 263 have existed for some time, they 
have long been considered vague, subjective, and the source of much litigation. See, e.g., 
Otis v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 671, 674-75 (1980) (holding that the replacement of carpets, 
draperies, refrigerators, and dishwashers "was more than mere incidental repair" and 
would thus need to be capitalized). AB a result, the Treasury has recently issued new 
regulations expanding and clarifying the rules surrounding improvements. Treas. Reg. 
§ l.263(a)-l, -2, -3 (2014). 
2016] BRANDING TAXATION 457 

ensure compliance with advertising laws?269 If the government 
excluded employee compensation from the definition of advertising 
to resolve controversies and eliminate the burden on taxpayers of 
allocating transaction costs,270 inequities would emerge. Large 
firms with in-house marketing staff and legal staff handling 
advertising matters would be permitted to deduct compensation 
related to advertising, whereas small firms that have to pay 
outside marketing firms and consultants to perform functions 
related to advertising would be required to capitalize such 
expenses. 
A capitalization rule for usual brand advertising would also 
necessarily contain various limitations and exceptions difficult for 
taxpayers to apply and for the government to administer. As an 
example, a default capitalization rule would most likely contain an 
exception for usual brand advertising that produced only short­
term benefits (say twelve months or less), which would lead to 
controversies between taxpayers and the government over the 
duration of benefits.271 Assume a business pays a fee to a radio 
ws Professor Nellen raised these excellent points in her criticism of Rep. David Camp's 
proposal to capitalize advertising expenses. Nellen, supra note 244. 
210 Under current law, there is an assumption that employee compensation and overhead 
costs do not facilitate the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of an intangible asset, 
regardless of the percentage of time that is allocable to capital transactions. See Guidelines 
for Intangibles Under IRC § 263(a), IRS (Oct. 27, 2015), https:/fwww.irs.gov/businesses/gui 
delines-for-intangibles-under-irc-section-263-a ("[U)ntil further guidance is finalized, 
capitalization will not be asserted under § 263(a) for employee compensation ..., fixed 
overhead, or de minimus costs related to the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of 
intangible assets or benefits."). Employee compensation, which is not subject to 
capitalization under the simplifying convention, includes salary, bonuses, and commissions 
paid to an employee of the taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(ii). The employee 
simplifying convention is extended to amounts paid to so-called independent contractors 
and outside contractors for secretarial, clerical, and similar administrative services. Id. 
211 Such an exception exists in current regulations governing the capitalization of certain 
intangible assets. Under the so-called "12·month rule," applicable to most self-created 
intangibles, a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts that provide benefits of a 
relatively brief duration. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)·4(f)(l)(i}-(ii). Specifically, the regulations 
provide that a taxpayer is not required to capitalize amounts paid to create any right or 
benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond the earlier of: (1) twelve months after 
the taxpayer first realizes the right or benefit; or (2) the end of the taxable year that follows 
the taxable year in which the payment is made. Id. The purpose of the twelve-month rule 
was to reduce the administrative and compliance costs inherent in applying section 263(a) 
to amounts paid to create intangible assets. Guidance Regarding Deduction and 
Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,701, 77, 708 (Dec. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 
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station to play a jingle on the radio during November of Year One, 
but potential consumers continue to sing the jingle while 
showering and driving in their cars throughout Years Two and 
Three. Would the fee fall within the short-term-benefits 
exemption and be expensed because the contract with the radio 
station was for one month, or would the fee be capitalized under 
the default rule because the advertising investment really didn't 
expire by the end of Year One? Expensing, rather than 
capitalization, of usual advertising would avoid the need to make 
determinations like this and provide certainty and clarity to 
minimize costs of compliance and administration. 
In addition to the economic and administrative efficiencies 
achieved under the current system (via tax expensing of ordinary 
brand advertising), expensing ordinary product advertising also 
creates an even playing field between (1) businesses that spend 
money to advertise and build up the goodwill value in their own 
trademarks and (2) businesses that choose, instead, to license from 
others the right to use well-known trademarks in connection with 
the products they manufacture and sell. While expensing of the 
former has long been allowed, the deductibility of the latter (sales­
based royalty payments) has been the subject of litigation and 
regulation. It is now settled that if a taxpayer obtains a license to 
use well-known trademarks in connection with certain products 
manufactured and distributed by the taxpayer and agrees to pay 
royalties to the licensor based on a percentage of net sales of the 
products bearing the licensor's trademarks, the royalty payments 
can be expensed, rather than capitalized, to the products 
produced.272 Treating equally those taxpayers who spend money to 
26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The rule is easily applied with respect to pre-paid expenses and contract 
rights. Such a rule might prove more difficult to apply with respect to benefits of usual 
advertising, the duration of which is not easily determined. 
272 The IRS's initial position on the deductibility of sales-based trademark royalties was 
tested in Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. u. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1037, T.C. Mem. 2009-9 
(Jan. 14, 2009), rev'd, 600 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010). The taxpayer, a kitchen tool 
manufacturing company, licensed the rights to use well-known trademarks in connection 
with some of the kitchen tools it produced and sold, agreeing to pay royalties to licensors 
based on a percentage of net sales of the tools bearing the licensors' trademarks. Robinson 
Knife, 600 F.3d at 123. The taxpayer deducted the royalty payments as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. Id. at 124. The IRS determined that the royalties paid 
should be capitalized as indirect costs allocable to products (kitchen tools) produced. Id. 
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build up the value of their own marks and those taxpayers who 
spend money to license already-valuable marks achieves 
fairness-an important goal of tax policy.273 
Although expensing is permitted for usual brand advertising, 
there is an important exception. A taxpayer must capitalize the 
cost of tangible assets associated with advertising; specifically, 
"expenditures for billboards, signs, and other tangible assets 
associated with advertising remain subject to the usual rules with 
respect to capitalization."274 By creating a tax distinction between 
the cost of intangibles associated with brand advertising 
(expensed) and the cost of tangible assets associated with brand 
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the taxpayer. Id. at 122-23. Although the Second 
Circuit rejected the taxpayer's argument that the royalty payments were deductible as 
marketing, selling, advertising, or distribution costs, it was persuaded by the taxpayer's 
argument that the royalty payments were not "properly allocable to property produced" 
within the meaning of Treas. Reg.§ l.263A-l(e): "We hold that where, as here, a producer's 
royalty payments (1) are calculated as a percentage of sales revenue from inventory and (2) 
are incurred only upon the sale of that inventory, they are immediately deductible as a 
matter of law because they are not 'properly allocable to property produced.'" Robinson 
Knife, 600 F.3d at 122-23. After the Second Circuit's decision in Robinson Knife, the 
Treasury Department issued proposed regulations on sales-based royalties. Sales-Based 
Royalties and Vendor Allowances, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,940-44 (Dec. 17, 2010) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). The proposed regulations provide a taxpayer-favorable result 
similar to that reached by the Second Circuit. Technically, the proposed regulations provide 
that sales-based royalties may be capitalizable to property produced by a taxpayer. Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § l.263A-l(e)(3)(i)(A), 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,943 (Dec. 17, 2010). The proposed 
regulations also provide a broad relief provision that such royalties required to be 
capitalized are allocable only to costs of goods sold (and not ending inventory). Prop. Treas. 
Reg.§ l.263A-l(e)(3)(ii)(U)(2), 75 Fed. Reg. 78,940, 78,943 (Dec. 17, 2010). So, although the 
regulations do not say that sales-based royalty costs are inherently non-capitalizable, they 
do provide that otherwise capitalizable sales-based royalties are properly allocable to 
property sold during the year. In short, the proposed regulations achieve a similar result to 
that produced in Robinson Knife. Most taxpayers will not have to capitalize their sales­
based royalties into ending inventory. 
273 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual 
Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010) ("[T]ax fairness ... is usually described 
in terms of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity requires that persons who are similarly 
situated should be taxed in a similar fashion. A related concept of equity is that 
economically equivalent activities should be taxed in the same manner even if they differ in 
form. Horizontal equity was once considered the primary goal of tax policy, and even if no 
longer held in quite this same regard, it nonetheless remains an important principle of tax 
theory."). 
274 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71, 83 (1995). Final Treasury 
Regulations issued in 2013 dealing with the capitalization of tangible assets confirm this 
result. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2(d)(l). 
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advertising (capitalized), tax considerations potentially distort a 
taxpayer's brand strategy. Tax rules should embrace the principle 
of efficiency and minimize the social costs of taxation.275 
Specifically, tax rules for branding expenditures should be 
neutral-they should not interfere with a taxpayer's economic 
behavior and should avoid deadweight losses caused by 
restructuring of branding activities to minimize taxes.276 Over the 
past half century, the principle of neutrality has lost ground to 
what might be termed "social engineering," and there now exist 
many tax rules in place that deliberately attempt to drive 
economic decisionmaking.277 It is questionable, however, whether 
neutrality violations in the branding context represent sound tax 
policy. For example, why should a business be permitted to deduct 
the cost of Facebook advertising or television advertising, but not 
the cost of an advertising sign or billboard? Does the former 
achieve a more important social engineering policy or advance the 
public interest more so than the latter? Such a tax distinction is 
also difficult to reconcile because intellectual property produced 
275 "[A] criterion of sound tax policy-efficiency-has been measured by contradictory 
standards and means various things in various contexts." Nguyen & Maine, supra note 
273, at 5. Efficiency can be viewed as a utilitarian concept that seeks a balance between 
maximizing tax revenues and minimizing the social costs of taxation. See Herman P. 
Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic Concept or Budgetary Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 
1152, 1153 (2001) (describing tax policies that "spend[] much less on a per capita basis" as 
sufficient); Edward A Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax 
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978-1012 (1986) (describing the impact of tax incentives 
under different definitions of efficiency); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform 
Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 63 (1996) (describing three forms of taxes that create 
distortions and stating that "(e]fficient taxes distort as little as possible"). 
276 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBOR.AH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLlClES 29 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that efficiency requires that a tax 
interfere as little as possible with people's economic behavior); David Elkins, Horizontal 
Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POLY REV. 43, 47 (2006) (stating that 
efficient taxes minimize deadweight losses caused by taxpayer actions to reduce tax 
burdens by choosing courses of action that minimize tax). 
211 Many of the special tax provisions governing patents and copyrights, for example, were 
a deliberate attempt to support the social-utility mandate of patent and copyright laws. 
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation: 
Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals?, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 831 
(2011). Tax expenditures in the form of deductions and credit for certain research and 
development, and short write-off periods for certain intellectual property acquisitions, were 
deliberately designed to drive economic decisionmaking to achieve more important 
intellectual property social policies. Id. at 831-33. 
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from ordinary brand advertising (copyrights, trade dress, 
trademarks) generally depends on tangible forms for their creative 
existence. 
2. Capitalizing Unusual Advertising Expenditures. Although 
sound policy arguments can be made for expensing ordinary brand 
advertising expenditures, arguments can be made for capitalizing 
advertising campaign expenditures (specifically, costs of graphic 
designs and package designs). Historically, advertising campaign 
costs were charged to capital accounts, but as a result of a 
significant, unexplained change in tax policy in 2004, they are now 
expensed.278 We believe this policy shift was inappropriate and 
that no circumstances justify divergence from the norm when it 
comes to campaign costs.279 We argue below that ordinary brand 
advertising expenses should be equated with deductible repairs to 
tangible property, whereas advertising campaign expenditures 
should be equated with capitalized improvements to tangible 
property. Such a standard would be superior to historic standards 
that were used in distinguishing between deductible and 
nondeductible advertising. 
Much of the historic uncertainty over the proper tax treatment 
of package design costs resulted from a lack of clarity over the 
proper standard to apply. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & 
Loan Ass'n, the Supreme Court concluded that an expenditure 
that serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset must 
be capitalized.280 Later in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, the 
Supreme Court minimized the importance of the separate-and­
21s See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. Before final regulations were issued 
in 2004, the IRS took the position that the costs of creating a package design must be 
capitalized, because package designs do not have ascertainable useful lives. Rev. Proc. 
2002-9, 2002-3 C.B. 327 (§ 3.01); Rev. Proc. 97-35, 1997-2 C.B. 448 (§ 5); Rev. Rul. 89-23, 
1989-1 C.B. 85 (1989). 
219 Professor Johnson has argued for the capitalization of package design costs. See 
Johnson, supra note 258, at 1127 ("Package design costs are not meritorious enough to be 
subsidized by the tax system by way of expensing or with an artificially short life."). 
Professor Johnson states that product design costs are capitalized, and that "no viable 
distinction can be made between good design for the product being sold and good design for 
the package it comes in." Id. We do not understand Professor Johnson's rationale, as 
product design costs may be expensed under section 174 of the Code. Nevertheless, we 
agree with his conclusion and adopt an alternative rationale for capitalization. 
2so 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971); see also supra notes 122-23. 
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distinct-asset test of Lincoln Savings and adopted a broad future 
benefits standard for capitalization.281 But, final regulations 
providing comprehensive rules for capitalization of intangibles 
effectively repealed the significant future benefits standard of 
INDOPCO and revived the separate-and-distinct asset test of 
Lincoln Savings.282 
The current intangibles regulations allow package design costs 
to be expensed rather than capitalized; specifically, they provide 
that a package design is not a separate and distinct asset, the cost 
of which must be capitalized.283 The regulation adopted the result 
in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Commissioner.284 In RJR Nabisco, an 
important trade dress and copyright development case, the Tax 
Court did not accept that there existed a distinction between the 
benefits of advertising campaign expenditures and advertising 
execution expenditures to justify differing tax treatment.285 The 
government argued that advertising campaign expenditures 
provide long-term benefits, whereas advertising execution 
expenditures give rise to short-term benefits; thus, the former 
should be capitalized, while the latter may be expensed.286 But the 
court did not accept the long-term, short-term distinction and 
instead found that trade dress is a product of both advertising 
campaign and execution expenditures.287 The court then 
concluded that the long-term benefit associated with trade dress 
must be a benefit traditionally associated with ordinary business 
advertising and cannot serve as a basis to require capitalization of 
advertising campaign expenditures.288 
The court's reasoning in RJR Nabisco is fundamentally flawed. 
It is indeed strange to conclude that advertising campaign 
expenditures (which historically have been charged to capital 
accounts) should be expensed on the basis that advertising 
execution expenditures (which historically have been deductible) 
2s1 503 U.S. 79, 86-90; see also supra note 124 and accompanying text. 

282 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 

283 Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4(b)(3)(v). 

28~ 76 T.C.M. (CCR) 71 (1998). 

2sr, Id. at 84-85. 

286 Id. at 83. 

2s1 Id. at 84. 

288 Id. 
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produce some of the same benefits as the campaign expenditures. 
This would be tantamount to arguing that the cost of replacing a 
leaking roof should be expensed on the basis that a repair of some 
shingles on the roof (appropriately expensed under current law) 
would produce the same benefit-fixing the leak. 
Neither standard-the future benefits approach under 
INDOPCO or the separate-and-distinct asset test in Lincoln 
Savings and the current intangibles regulations-truly provides 
the certainty and clarity necessary for distinguishing between 
deductible and non-deductible advertising expenditures. As noted 
in RJR Nabisco, both advertising campaign expenditures and 
advertising execution expenditures contribute to trade dress-a 
separate and distinct asset by most non-tax law definitions of 
property.289 Trade dress is the packaging of a product or service, 
the overall image, or total look and feel of a product or service.290 
Trade dress can be the decor and ambience of a restaurant, the 
packaging designs of cigars, and the look of and feel of a website.291 
Trade dress is entitled to registration with the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office.292 Trade dress enjoys all protection 
accorded trademarks under the Lanham Act. 293 Likewise, both 
advertising campaign expenditures and advertising execution 
expenditures produce long-term benefits; indeed, trade dress, a 
289 The intangibles regulations define a separate and distinct intangible asset as: 
a property interest ofascertainable and measurable value in money's worth 
that is subject to protection under applicable [s]tate, [l]ederal, or foreign 
law and the possession and control ofwhich is intrinsically capable of being 
sold, transferred, or pledged (ignoring any restrictions imposed on 
assignability) separate and apart from a trade or business. 
Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-4(h)(3)(i) (2014). Then however, the regulations state that an amount 
paid to create a package design is not treated as an amount that creates a separate and 
distinct intangible asset. Id. § l.263(a)-4(b )(3)(v). 
200 See Trade Dress, INT'L TRADEMARK Ass'N (Nov. 2015), http://www.inta.orgfrrademark 
Basics/FactSheets/Pagesfrrade-Dress.aspx ("Trade dress is the overall commercial image 
(look and feel) of a product that indicates or identifies the source of the product and 
distinguishes it from those ofothers."). 
291 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 766-67 (1992) (finding a 
restaurant's trade dress to be inherently distinctive); RJR Nabisco, 76 T.C.M. (CCII) at 73 
(finding the packaging for cigarettes to constitute trade dress). 
292 See Trade Dress, supra note 290 (delineating requirements to register trade dress with 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office). 
293 See id. ("[T]rade dress like a trademark, is protected under the Federal Trademark Act 
(Lanham Act),"). 
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product of both marketing campaigns and executions thereof, 
provides long-term benefits over the life of the brand.294 Thus, 
neither a "separate asset'' test nor a "benefits" test provides a 
useful framework for tax distinctions involving advertising. 
The regulatory rules on tax treatment of repairs and 
improvements to tangible property present a better framework for 
determining the appropriate tax treatment of advertising. We 
believe advertising campaign expenditures to build brand equity 
can be analogized to costs of improvements to tangible property, 
which have long been considered capital expenditures.295 
A business's valuable assets can be broken down into two 
categories-tangible property and intangible property. The cost to 
initially acquire tangible or intangible property must be 
capitalized. For example, the cost to construct or purchase a 
business building must be capitalized.296 Likewise, the fees paid to 
obtain initial registration of a trademark or to purchase another's 
trademark must be capitalized.297 After acquisition, a business 
spends money to maintain and enhance the value of both its 
tangible and intangible assets. For example, a business regularly 
spends money to maintain its building to keep it in an efficient 
operating condition. A business also sometimes spends 
substantial sums to materially improve its building (e.g., a major 
renovation or refurbishing of the building). Similarly, a business 
regularly spends money to advertise its trademark though various 
materials and techniques. On occasion a business spends 
substantial sums on marketing campaigns introducing new 
marketing concepts, themes, imagery, slogans, and the like. 
It has long been the rule that expenditures for repairs and 
maintenance to tangible property (incidental repairs that neither 
materially add to the value of the tangible property nor 
appreciably prolong its original life, but keep it in an ordinarily 
29i See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. 
295 I.R.C. § 263(a) (2012). 
200 Treas. Reg. § L263(a)·2(d)(l) (requiring capitalization of amounts paid to acquire or 
produce "a unit of real or personal property"). Capitalized acquisition costs include related 
transactions costs such as appraisal fees, commissions, and accounting and legal fees. Id. 
§ L263(a)-2(f). 
297 Id.§ l.263(a)-4(1), Example 9. 
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efficient operating condition) may be deducted currently.298 In 
contrast, expenditures for improvements (that add to the value, or 
substantially prolong the useful life, of tangible property or that 
adapt property to a new or different use) must be capitalized. 299 
As with the problem of distinguishing between deductible and 
nondeductible advertising, distinguishing between deductible 
repairs and nondeductible improvements can be difficult under 
either a separate asset test or future benefits test. Neither repairs 
nor improvements to tangible property necessarily result in a 
separate and distinct tangible asset. Both, however, arguably 
produce benefits for the tangible property extending beyond the 
current year. 
Due to the difficulties of applying a generic separate-and­
distinct asset or future benefits test to distinguish deductible 
repairs from capital improvements, the Treasury Department 
issued a new regulatory framework in 2013.300 Generally, 
amounts paid for repairs and maintenance to tangible property are 
deducible unless they result in an "improvement" to property.301 
Tangible property is deemed to be improved in three situations: (1) 
betterments, (2) restorations, and (3) adaptations to new or 
different uses.302 
First, expenditures for betterments to tangible property must 
be capitalized.so3 "Betterments" are changes to the property that 
are a material addition to the property or are "reasonably expected 
to materially increase the productivity, efficiency, strength, 
quality, or output of the unit of property."304 Second, expenditures 
for restoration, like expenditures for betterments, must be 
capitalized.305 A restoration occurs in a variety of situations but 
typically involves a major renovation or refurbishing of a tangible 
200 See infra notes 300--07. 
200 See infra notes 300--07. 
:ioo Treas. Reg.§§ 1.263(a)-l, -2, -3 (2014); see also supra note 268. 
301 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 («A taxpayer may deduct amounts paid for repairs and 
maintenance to tangible property if the amounts paid are not otherwise required to be 
capitalized."). 
302 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(d). 
:ma Id. § 1.263(a)-3(j)(l). 
301 Id. § (j)(l)(iii). 
:105 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(l). 
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asset.aoo Finally, expenditures that adapt tangible property to a 
new or different use ("if the adaption is not consistent with the 
taxpayer's ordinary use ... at the time originally placed in service 
by the taxpayer") must also be capitalized.307 
The new regulatory framework for distinguishing deductible 
repairs from capital improvements does not look to whether any 
new asset was created or whether benefits last beyond the current 
year. Rather, it focuses on the nature of the activities giving rise 
to the expenditures. This approach is presently used by the 
government in determining whether research and development 
expenditures can be expensed under section 17 4 of the Code.aos 
Under the regulations, in determining whether research and 
development costs can be deducted, the nature of the product 
being developed is irrelevant; instead, the focus is on the "nature 
of the activity to which the expenditures relate."309 Such an 
approach would be well suited in similarly distinguishing 
deductible advertising from nondeductible advertising. 
A marketing campaign's impact on a company's valuable 
intangible assets is similar to the impact of capital improvements 
to a company's tangible property. A marketing campaign does not 
sell anything, but rather prescribes an intangible marketing 
concept (usually long-term) characterized by an image, theme, 
slogan, or message.310 It can be equated to betterments to tangible 
property if the advertising campaign is expected to materially 
increase the strength of a brand. Alternatively, an advertising 
campaign can be equated to a restoration if the campaign is 
expected to rejuvenate an existing trademark. To the extent a 
campaign adapts an existing trademark to new products, new 
times, or new media, it could be equated to an adaptation to a 
306 Id. 
307 Id. § 1.263(a)-3(l)(l). 
30s Id.§ 1.14-2(a)(l). 
309 Id. Deductible research expenses are broadly defined as "expenditures incurred in 
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business which represent research and development 
costs in the experimental or laboratory sense." ld. The regulations require that such 
expenditures be incurred in "activities intended to discover information that would 
eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a product." ld. 
310 See Marketing Campaign, INVESTOPEDIA, http:l/www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marke 
ting-campaign.asp (defining "marketing campaign" as "a coordinated series of steps through 
different mediums" to "promote a product, service or business"). 
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different use. In any of these scenarios, the campaign 
expenditures should be capitalized. 
Moreover, a marketing campaign enhances the existing 
trademark's reputation, translating into an increase in the 
distinctiveness of the trademark in the mind of the consuming 
public. As public awareness or perception of the trademark rises, 
the level of protection under trademark law increases. If the 
trademark attains famous status, the trademark owner can gain a 
unique, property-like status in the famous trademark.311 That 
means the trademark owner can assert action against many new 
entrants using similar marks, even absent a likelihood of 
consumer confusion between the famous mark and the new 
entrant's mark.312 Essentially, a marketing campaign can lift the 
status of the trademark to a higher ievel of protection that is not 
available to the majority of trademarks. 
Later individual executions of a campaign, in contrast, focus 
more on the sale of a product and typically involve routine changes 
to advertising materials or techniques to maintain customer 
interest in the original marketing concept. The taxpayer incurs 
institutional or goodwill advertising costs to keep its name before 
consumers. These advertising executions do not resemble 
betterments, restorations, or adaptations to different use in the 
regulations governing tangible property and thus should be 
expensed. 
Requiring the capitalization of advertising campaign 
expenditures (specifically graphic design and package design 
costs), which resemble improvement costs to tangible property, 
would go toward reconciling the tax treatment of tangible and 
intangible assets. This is something the government has 
attempted to achieve in the past, at least with respect to tax 
depreciation rules.313 Capitalization of campaign expenditures 
3 11 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in 
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 89, 99-101 (2011) (discussing trademark dilution law 
and how famous trademarks with national fame obtain property-like protection). 
312 See id. at 95 ("The owner of the 'famous' name ... can enjoy the right to exclude even 
without proof of likelihood of confusion caused by use of the famous name by others on 
noncompeting goods."). 
:113 At one point in tax history, the rules for depreciating intangible intellectual property 
assets differed dramatically from the corresponding set of rules for depreciating tangible 
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would likewise go toward reconciling the tax treatment of brand 
development with brand enforcement, both of which are necessary 
under intellectual property law. Such a regime would require 
capitalization of salaries paid to employees primarily engaged in 
developing package designs. It would also continue to require the 
capitalization of fees paid to a governmental agency to obtain or 
renew a trademark, trade name, copyright, or other similar right 
granted by that governmental agency. 
Under current law, capitalized advertising expenditures would 
be amortized over fifteen years. As noted earlier, fifteen years 
seems to be accepted by the government as the appropriate 
recovery period for intangibles.314 There is limited empirical data, 
assets. Over time, Congress enacted a detailed set of arbitrary depreciation rules for all 
tangible assets. These Code provisions provided arbitrary conventions and methods for 
depreciating costs of tangible assets, and more importantly, they provided artificially low 
recovery periods (e.g., three, five, and seven years) for many tangible assets that arguably 
have longer useful Jives. I.R.C. §§ 167-168 (2012). This disparate treatment between 
intellectual property assets and tangible assets created distortions that were unfair to 
taxpayers. See Walburn, supra note 140, at 454-56 (explaining that the inequity between 
similarly situated taxpayers resulted in noncompliance and much litigation, which 
unnecessarily burdened the administration of tax law). For example, taxpayers who 
acquired businesses with mostly tangible assets fared better than taxpayers who acquired 
businesses with mostly intangible assets. This problem worsened as more and more 
valuable business assets took the form of intangible assets. See Tax Treatment of Intangible 
Assets: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 102d Cong. 23 (1991) (Statement of 
Hon. Guy Vander Jagt) ("Taxpayers now spending considerable efforts and costs to prepare 
detailed appraisals solely for the sake of distinguishing between intangible assets that are 
amortizable as compared with those that are nonamortaizable.... [E)ven greater expenses 
are incurred when the I.R.S. challenges the treatment of these assets on audit and through 
litigation."); id. at 30 (Statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Gideon, Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy, 
Dep't of Treasury) (describing the rise of intangible assets in the market and the consequent 
necessity of a law that provides certainty on the taxation of such assets). Seeking to 
mitigate these distortions, many saw the need to reconcile the treatment of acquired 
intangible assets with the treatment of acquired tangible assets. See DAVID W. BRAZELL ET 
AL., OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL TAX DEPRECIATION POLICY 4, 12 
(1989), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/documents/ota64.pdf 
(explaining that "the first income tax regulations denied depreciation allowances for 
goodwill ... and other intangibles"). In 1993, Congress responded with section 197, which 
prescribes an arbitrary fifteen-year recovery period for many intangibles. See LaFrance, 
supra note 139, at 320 ("Congress enacted Section 197 in order to simplify the rules for 
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of controversies arising from the need to 
determine which intangibles are depreciable . . . . The statute achieves these goals by 
imposing the fifteen-year straight-line method on most acquired intangibles."). 
314 See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
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however, suggesting that the life of a brand is much less, and 
therefore, a shorter recovery may be justified.315 
B. IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE TAX FRAMEWORK FOR BRAND 
ENFORCEMENT EXPENDITURES 
As described earlier in this Article, litigation costs in patent and 
copyright infringement cases are deductible; however, attorney's 
fees and other litigation costs paid in connection with trademark 
infringement claims are generally capitalized.316 Although it 
would be appealing from a tax advantage to view copyright, 
patent, and trademark infringement actions generically, such 
treatment would "ignore[] the actual inherent differences and 
purposes of the various rights and remedies involved."317 While 
copyright and patent infringement claims are brought for the 
purpose of protecting royalties previously derived as well as those 
to be derived in the future, trademark infringement claims are 
brought for the principal purpose of removing the infringing threat 
to a trademark, securing the property right of the taxpayer in the 
trademark, eliminating future infringement, and increasing the 
value of the taxpayer's trademark. One court's view of trademark 
infringement suits was as follows: 
The purpose and effect of the [trademark litigation] 
expenses ... was to increase the value of taxpayer's 
registered trademark and to make more secure 
315 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW SOURCES OF GROWTH: KNOWLEDGE­
BASED CAPITAL 14 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/sfi/inno/knowledge-based-capital-synthesis. 
pdf (noting the productive life of branding is 2.8 years). The appropriate amortization 
period for capitalized advertising costs is beyond the scope of this Article. 
316 See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text. Tax symmetry dictates that the awards 
and settlements in such suits be treated differently for tax purposes. Indeed, it is generally 
held that awards and settlements in patent and copyright infringement suits are taxed as 
ordinary income. See, e.g., Big Four Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 1055, 1060 (1963) (finding 
that award in patent infringement litigation is taxable as ordinary income); Mathey v. 
Comm'r, 177 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir. 1949) ("[A]n award of damages is ordinarily ... taxable to 
him as income in the ear received."). In contrast, awards and settlements in trademark 
infringement suits are received tax free if the basis of the claims lies in the trademark. See, 
e.g., Inco Electroenergy Corp. v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 359 (1987) (finding settlement 
proceeds obtained in trademark litigation are taxable as capital gains). 
311 I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 199925012, 1999 WL 42489, at *3 (June 25, 1999). 
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taxpayer's property in it by forever eliminating the 
possibility of having it impaired by the competitive use 
of this confusingly similar mark. Thus, though the 
complaint for infringement as originally drawn 
included a plea for damages, taxpayer's expenses did 
not finance legal activity which recovered for 
petitioner lost income or preserved its right to retain 
income earned. The financial gain which petitioner 
realized from these legal proceedings, through the 
enhancement of the value of its registered trademark, 
is an increment of a sort which will endure for many 
years to come .... Financing the removal of a threat to 
a trademark posed by an infringing mark resembles 
the cost of perfecting or preserving title to property, a 
cost well established as a capital expenditure, much 
more than it resembles a current business expense.318 
Tax law generally does not place weight on the form of 
litigation. For example, as noted above an infringement claim for 
one type of intellectual property (patent or copyright) is not 
necessarily treated the same for tax purposes as an infringement 
claim for a different kind (trademark). Tax law instead relies on 
the substance of the litigation, and for that, the plaintiffs primary 
motivation in a particular claim (recover profits versus enhance 
value or defend property) is crucial.319 This harkens back to the 
judicially-crafted "substance over form" doctrine in tax 
jurisprudence-the substance of a transaction will prevail over its 
form.320 
There is one exception, however, in which case law has 
arguably elevated form over substance. In trademark litigation, 
the trademark owner asserts both trademark infringement and 
unfair competition claims. While it is generally settled that 
3l8 Danskin, Inc. v. Comm'r, 331 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1964) (citations omitted). 
319 See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (describing the "origin-of-claim" test, 
developed originally to determine whether costs of litigation were business-related or 
personal, and later adapted to determine if litigation costs are deductible). 
320 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (finding that a corporation 
created only to transfer corporate shares to the petitioner "immediately was put to death" 
once that purpose was realized). 
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litigation costs in connection with a trademark infringement claim 
must be capitalized, at least one case permitted current expensing 
of litigation costs in connection with an unfair competition claim 
on the basis that an unfair competition claim has its origin in 
recovery of profits.321 In Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 
discussed earlier, it was reasoned that the primary purpose of a 
trademark infringement claim is to "secure a judicial 
determination that the plaintiff had property rights in the mark," 
but the primary purpose of an unfair competition count is to 
"secure money damages for alleged unfair competition, passing off, 
etc."322 This tax distinction is questionable. 
Trademark infringement claims arise under section 32 of the 
Lanham Act and are available for registered trademarks.323 
Unfair competition claims arise under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act and are available to both unregistered and registered 
trademarks. 324 Although a plaintiff must have a federally 
registered mark to bring a section 32 trademark infringement 
claim,325 the two claims are closely related.326 The same standard 
for determining whether a trademark is valid and entitled to 
protection applies to both claims.327 The same standard for 
establishing infringement-likelihood of consumer confusion­
applies to both claims: "[I]n either a claim of trademark 
infringement under § 32 or a claim of unfair competition under 
§ 43, a prima facie case is made out by showing the use of one's 
32 1 Rust-Oleum Corp. v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1967); see also supra 
notes 220-36 and accompanying text. 
322 Rust-Oleum, 280 F. Supp. at 801. 
323 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012). 
324 Id. § l 125(a). 
32s Id.§ 1114(1). 
326 Claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition "are subject to the same 
test." Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008); Century 21 Real 
Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The 'ultimate' test for unfair 
competition is exactly the same as for trademark infringement: whether the public is likely 
to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks." (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
327 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) ("[I]t is common 
ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks and that the general 
principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the Lanham Act are for the most 
part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is entitled to protection under 
§ 43(a)."). 
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trademark by another in a way that is likely to confuse consumers 
as to the source of the product."328 Most courts analyze the 
likelihood-of-consumer confusion test and apply the same 
conclusion to both claims.329 Typically, the court extends its 
finding in one claim to the other claim without wasting time and 
judicial resources in repeating its finding. With respect to 
remedies, both claims offer similar relief, including injunction and 
damages. 330 After all, as courts have long observed, "the law of 
trademark infringement is but a part of the law of unfair 
competition, and the same test is applied in determining each 
claim."331 
In light of the similarities between the two claims, litigation 
costs in trademark infringement suits should be treated the 
same-capitalized. Such approach would not elevate form over 
substance, but instead would recognize that the primary purpose 
of the trademark plaintiff is to establish the plaintiffs trademark 
and not to recover income, as in the case of patent and copyright 
infringement suits. Such approach would also avoid arbitrary 
apportionments of expenses between deductible and nondeductible 
expenditures that would be required if trademark infringement 
328 Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). 
329 See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Under the Lanham 
Act, ... we use the same test to decide whether there has been trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, or false designation of origin: the likelihood of confusion between the 
two marks."); see also Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus. Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472-73 
(3d Cir. 1994) (explaining the similar tests used to establish common law and federal 
trademark law and unfair competition claims. 
:~m 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) ("When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark 
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office . . . shall have been established in any civil 
action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, ... subject to the principles 
of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and 
(3) the costs of the action. . . . In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, 
according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual 
damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find that the amount of 
the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its 
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the 
circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above circumstances shall constitute 
compensation and not a penalty. The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party."). 
331 Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 664 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916)). 
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claims and unfair competition claims were treated differently for 
tax purposes.332 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Brand advertising and enforcement represent a significant 
investment by most firms. Yet, surprisingly, little scholarship is 
devoted to the ideal tax regime that should govern investments in 
both brand building and brand enforcement. Current tax rules 
governing branding evolved in the absence of an appropriate legal 
framework. The result is a regime with incoherent tax distinctions 
that lack theoretical justification, suggesting that legislative or 
administrative changes are warranted. This Article concludes that 
the current tax treatment of ordinary brand advertising 
(expensing) serves legitimate goals--expensing stimulates 
economic growth, furthers administrative efficiency, and creates 
an even playing field between businesses that advertise their own 
brands and businesses that choose instead to license from others 
the right to use well-known trademarks. However, current tax 
treatment of advertising campaigns (expensing) is fundamentally 
flawed: campaign expenditures, which strengthen, restore, or 
elevate the brand, should be analogized to costs of improvements 
to tangible property, which have long been considered 
nondeductible capital expenditures. This Article also concludes 
that the current tax distinction between trademark infringement 
claims and unfair competition claims is unjustified. If substance is 
to prevail in tax jurisprudence, litigation costs incurred in unfair 
competition claims should be capitalized to reflect that both claims 
are brought primarily to establish a taxpayer's trademark and not 
to recover income. 
332 In Rust-Oleum, the court merely split the litigation costs fifty-fifty between those 
attributable to the trademark infringement count (not deductible) and those attributable to 
the unfair competition count (deductible). 280 F. Supp. 796, 801 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ("[T]he 
proper determination of the instant controversy is to divide the expenses ... including those 
incident to the surveys, equally between those properly deductible and those not so 
deductible."). 
